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Executive summary  
This report describes the main findings and recommendations of research 
carried out for the Partners for Resilience (PfR) alliance on how the PfR 
programme is affected by – or may affect – conflict. Although PfR works in 
different conflict-affected countries and contexts, it does not address conflict 
or insecurity explicitly. This is potentially problematic for PfR’s effectiveness. 
It is therefore important to consider whether PfR could or should address 
conflict more explicitly.  
For this research, a qualitative analysis of the experiences within the 
ongoing PfR programme was conducted in all 10 countries: Ethiopia, 
Guatemala, Haiti, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Mali, Philippines, South Sudan, 
Uganda and the regional programmes in Asia, Africa and Central America. The 
research was conducted by consultants and researchers from the International 
Institute of Social Studies, the Hague.  
The core of the study consisted of an online survey, for which PfR staff 
and partners from all countries were invited, in addition to Skype interviews 
and a desk study. In all, 52 people participated.  
The main research findings are summarised here. 
PfR experiences with conflict 
PfR alliance and CSO partners experience conflict in many forms and at all 
levels, whether between stakeholders in the PfR focus regions, or in the 
context of large-scale or structural violence and insecurity which hampers the 
entire environment in which partners work.  
Resource-based conflicts and social tension are embedded in all aspects of 
Integrated Risk Management (IRM), occurring within and between 
communities (for example, those with differentiated status or entitlement), 
between different resource user groups, or between communities and the 
government or private companies. Most of these conflicts relate to access to or 
usage of natural resources such as land, water or forest resources, sometimes 
complicated by tensions between different ethnic or identity groups. Lack of 
government regulation or enforcement of existing legislation can also deepen 
such conflicts, as can inequalities related to wealth, power, gender and 
marginality. 
In many conflicts, governments tend to favour the interests of private 
companies over those of communities. In some cases, the government itself is 
engaged in commercial resource exploitation. Weak governments often lack 
institutions that can resolve such conflicts. There is also often a lack of 
accountability from government towards local communities, which is 
particularly significant when the local government is a partner in PfR. This 
means that problems may be addressed and resolved within the network but 
can also lead to complications and dilemmas over how to address the issues.  
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Effects of conflict on the IRM approach 
The work of PfR and the IRM approach are affected by violence in different 
ways. Some areas are difficult to access, leading to monitoring challenges. 
Beneficiaries and CSO partners are sometimes targeted and violated. In some 
areas, programmes have been downscaled or halted. 
Threats of violence can lead partners to act with caution and avoid risks in 
addressing resource management, in particular the access to resources of 
marginal groups who suffer from structural and cultural violence. Threats are 
not uncommon but are not always reported on publicly as PfR does not want 
to expose their partners to further risk.  
Structural violence similarly stands in the way of IRM effectiveness. This is 
an issue in all PfR countries: laws and policies pertaining to control of 
resources and other economic matters can sustain patterns of marginalization 
and vulnerability. Structural violence against women is found in all countries: 
women are excluded from economic opportunities as they lack access to 
productive resources like land. There are also many instances of cultural 
violence affecting PfR work, including discrimination against indigenous 
peoples in Guatemala, the caste system in India, and tribal communities in the 
Philippines. These issues skew dialogue, impede fair resource management and 
lead to conflict.  
Civil society, core to the IRM approach, often finds itself at the heart of 
conflict. In some countries, the government criminalizes CSOs and advocacy 
groups and brands them as anti-government. Almost 25% of PfR partners 
experience ‘negative pressures’ from government officials and in some cases 
from private companies. This has serious consequences for programme 
implementation: in some cases, the governments prevent CSOs from working 
on ‘sensitive’ issues related to resource management.  
Does the IRM approach exacerbate conflict? 
Linkages between conflict and resource issues such as land-use planning make 
PfR partners a party in possible conflict. They are generally well aware of this 
and put great effort into navigating this to avoid exacerbating conflict. Many 
partners monitor evolving conflicts and assess the effects of their interventions 
on the conflict dynamics. They adapt programmes to changing realities on the 
ground. 
Conflicts can occur within and between communities concerning their 
selection and participation in the programme: who will benefit and how will 
these benefits be distributed? PfR partners employ participatory consultations 
with communities, which can lead to agreement on public and shared benefits. 
PfR partners indicate that engagement in IRM dialogues can sometimes be 
a risky business. The more large-scale and complex conflicts become – and the 
more interwoven with inequalities and identity politics – the more difficult it is 
to oversee the impacts of programme interventions.  
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How is conflict experienced differently by women and minorities?  
Among the research participants, there was a broad understanding that women 
are affected by structural and cultural violence. There were many examples of 
community-level conflicts directly related to gender, inequalities and identity 
politics. 
All research participants provided evidence on how they address gender 
inequalities in their programmes. There appears to be a PfR-wide deeply felt 
awareness that it is important to include women and make sure they have a 
voice in IRM. However, the attention to gender is not explicitly geared to the 
conflict dimensions and there was little evidence of using conflict-sensitive 
gender approaches. Survey responses also suggested insufficient attention to 
the question to how PfR addresses violence against other marginalized groups, 
for example ethnic minorities or lower castes.  
A number of responses conveyed how the inclusive IRM approach of 
PfR, favouring a strategy of dialogue rather than confrontation, may lead to 
situations where partners refrain from explicitly addressing underlying conflicts 
and the ways these affect marginalized groups.  
It also became clear that, even in programmes where specific attention was 
focused on the inclusion of women, these approaches may have unintended 
effects. For example, men sometimes reacted to feeling left out, or women 
ended up bearing the double burden for participating in ‘women’s’ 
programmes as well as carrying out their many other existing responsibilities.  
How does PfR deal with conflict?  
Addressing conflict is integral to the IRM approach. We distinguish three 
major aspects – monitoring conflict; addressing conflict in programme 
implementation; and conflict resolution – but in PfR practice they are often 
intertwined. 
In all three aspects, PfR partners and CSOs rely on dialogue and 
participation. Most have a ‘do no harm’ policy and prefer a ‘non-
confrontational’ approach based on facilitating stakeholder dialogue to deal 
with conflicting interests. Research participants say this gives the best results as 
it increases understanding between parties and can build bridges between 
communities and government and other stakeholders. 
The trade-off of taking a non-confrontational approach is that it may 
hinder addressing root causes and explicitly advocating for marginalized 
groups. PfR and CSO staff seem to be well aware of this inherent dilemma and 
portray their work as a balancing act. Certain pieces of information do not 
surface during formal multi-stakeholder meetings. This can be dealt with by 
complementing the meetings with informal interactions.  
PfR draws on many different participatory tools such as interest mapping, 
power analysis, survey and assessment tools, context analysis and conflict risk 
assessments. Many of these tools have been provided by the Dutch partners, 
but there is no shared set of tools at the level of PfR. The conflict-related tools 
are separately introduced from the IRM tools, even though some participants 
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observed that the IRM tools could be useful for conflict-related analysis. Some 
participants mention that having tools available does not mean that they are 
being used in practice. While there is a lot of knowledge and practice of 
conflict monitoring, conflict sensitivity and conflict resolution, it stems mainly 
from ‘learning by doing’ and many participants expressed a need for further 
capacity building, theoretical frameworks and guidelines.  
In sum, there are many concrete examples of how PfR was able to defuse 
or resolve a conflict. The examples were mainly geared to community-level and 
resource-based conflicts based on small-scale diplomacy with authorities to 
protect the interests of marginalized or oppressed groups. Large-scale, 
escalated and structural conflicts are often beyond the scope of influence of 
PfR.  
Conclusions: opportunities for PfR 
Conflicts and violence form part of the realities that PfR seeks to change 
through IRM. This means that conflict monitoring, conflict sensitivity and in 
many cases conflict resolution are part of the everyday practice of the PfR 
programme. Yet in the first two phases of the PfR programme from 2010-
2020, there has been no explicit attention to conflict, and as a result conflict-
related activity has mainly been developed through ‘learning by doing’ and 
sensitive deployment of IRM tools.  
A special challenge for PfR is that local-level resource-based conflicts and 
forms of structural violence occur between actors that are all included in the 
IRM approach of PfR, which is rooted in acceptance, dialogue and 
participatory multi-stakeholder activities. Whereas this inclusiveness is 
considered to be effective for PfR, it makes it challenging to directly confront 
the root causes of conflict. This creates operational dilemmas, and there is 
currently no space in PfR to report on dealing with conflicting interests within 
the programme, and hence there is no space for jointly discussing and learning 
from these dilemmas. A non-confrontational approach towards injustices may 
often be the best choice, but it is not the subject of policy discussion or 
reflection, and the question of how this affects the space to address the root 
causes of disaster risk remains largely unaddressed.  
PfR partners already have ample experience in elements of conflict-
sensitive programming, such as conflict risk analysis and assessments, inclusive 
planning and engagement in multi-stakeholder dialogues.  The development of 
new PfR programming provides a good opportunity to integrate conflict 
dynamics in the overall resilience framework of PfR and to support partners 
and CSOs to advance their conflict-sensitive work and conflict risk reduction.  
Recommendations 
The overall recommendation for PfR is to address conflict more explicitly in its 
IRM approach and to integrate conflict in the design and programming of a 
new phase. This would entail acknowledgment by PfR that conflict is 
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impacting the goals of PfR work, and a commitment to support and train staff 
in addressing conflict.  
More concretely, the report offers several recommendations and ideas for 
next steps. In line with suggestions of research participants, the key elements 
for conflict-sensitive programming for PfR partners are:  
1. transparent communication towards all parties 
2. facilitation of multi-stakeholder dialogues to increase parties’ 
understanding of conflict dynamics 
3. the creation of a safe spaces for stakeholders.  
It is also suggested that Netherlands embassies play a role in addressing 
conflict and supporting PfR, for example by lobbying stakeholders and 
supporting partners financially or otherwise. 
Moreover, PfR should create a conflict-sensitivity toolbox and develop 
guidelines for conflict-sensitive and inclusive policy and programming (not just 
including women, but also ethnic minorities) and training for its worldwide 
staff in the use of conflict risk assessment tools. We believe that these steps 
will make the work of PfR more effective and decrease the risk that 
interventions feed into conflict. A more detailed set of recommendations 
feature at the end of this report. 
Keywords 
Resilience in practice, Disaster Risk Reduction, Conflict, Partners for 
Resilience, Do no Harm 
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Strengthening community resilience in conflict: 
learnings from the Partners for Resilience programme 
 
1 Introduction 
Partners for Resilience (PfR) is an alliance of the Netherlands Red Cross with 
Cordaid, CARE Netherland, Wetlands International, the Red Cross Red 
Crescent Climate Centre and about 50 partner civil society organizations 
(CSOs) in Africa, Asia and Central America. PfR contributes to the resilience 
of vulnerable communities by integrating climate change adaptation and 
ecosystem management and restoration into Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR). 
With this Integrated Risk Management (IRM) approach, communities 
strengthen their capacities to reduce the impact of disasters. More information 
can be found on the PfR website: www.partnersforresilience.nl. 
Though PfR works in conflict-affected countries and contexts, it does not 
address conflict or insecurity explicitly. Even where it addresses conflict 
indirectly, this is rarely reported on. However, PfR work may be affected and 
even constrained by conflict, so the question arises as to whether PfR could or 
should address conflict more explicitly. 
To get more insights into the extent to which PfR partner organizations 
are affected by different types of conflict, PfR commissioned a study on how 
the alliance encounters and deals with conflict in its Integrated Risk 
Management approach. This report presents the findings, conclusions and 
recommendations of this study.  
The study was assigned to the research team of When Disaster meets 
Conflict led by professor Dorothea Hilhorst of ISS, Erasmus University, and 
also comprised independent consultant Marie-José Vervest and Isabelle 
Desportes, Samantha Melis, Rodrigo Mena and Roanne van Voorst of ISS.   
The team wishes to take the opportunity to thank all 52 research 
participants for their extensive contributions to the research. Participants were 
very open in sharing their elaborate experiences and provided many useful 
inputs, examples and suggestions both to the survey and during the skype 
interviews. In addition, 30 people from PfR joined the final validation webinar. 
Thanks so much!  
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2 Research questions  
The study investigated how IRM programming and implementation is affected 
by, influences, and could address conflict. It considered different types and 
levels of conflict, from micro- to macro-level, to develop a more nuanced 
understanding of what this means for IRM in general and for PfR programme 
specifically. The research was qualitative in nature, focusing on the analysis of 
the experiences of PfR and their local partner organizations in the PfR 
countries. This analysis led to the identification of some lessons learnt, key 
conclusions and a set of recommendations. 
The PfR Project Working Group formulated the following research 
questions:  
1. In what ways does PfR encounter conflicts and social tensions in its 
activities, both in the communities of intervention as well as in the IRM 
dialogues with government authorities and private companies at local, 
national and regional levels? 
2. What are the effects of these conflicts and social tensions on our IRM 
approach? 
3. How does an IRM approach affect conflict dynamics in intended and 
unintended ways? 
4. How are these effects differentiated for men and women, other genders, 
people of different castes, ethnicities, livelihoods, etc?  
5. What have been strategies of PfR to deal with conflict, and with what 
results? 
6. What opportunities are there for better integrating a conflict-sensitive 
approach and/or conflict risk reduction approach in IRM?  
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3   Methodology  
This section describes the research design and provides and overview of the 
participants. 
The research focused on a qualitative analysis of the experiences within PfR’s 
10 country programmes (Ethiopia, Guatemala, Haiti, India, Indonesia, Kenya, 
Mali, Philippines, South Sudan and Uganda) and its regional programmes in 
Asia, Africa and Central America.  
The core of the study consisted of an online survey, for which PfR staff 
and partners from all countries were invited, in addition to skype interviews 
and a desk study.  
The research started with a review of PfR annual country reports (2018) 
and some other key PfR documents to understand the context and identify 
what (if anything) PfR teams were reporting in relation to conflict and 
strategies to deal with it.  
The next step was a literature review of the latest research on ‘conflict 
intensity and scenarios’ and linkages between the three components of the 
Integrated Risk Management approach: ‘conflict and climate change’, ‘conflict 
and disasters’ and ‘conflict and (natural) resource management’. Literature on 
‘conflict-sensitive project implementation’ was also reviewed, focusing on 
‘gender and minority groups’, and ‘strengthening of civil society organizations’. 
Key findings from the literature review and the review of PfR documents 
were used to design an educational survey: an online survey developed for 
staff of PfR partners and CSOs. Each cluster of questions in this survey is 
introduced by explanatory text boxes. The purpose of the ‘educational 
introductions’ was twofold. They were meant to ensure that participants 
responded to the questions with a similar understanding of the concepts 
involved, and they were included to increase awareness of conflict-related 
issues that might be pertinent to PfR practice. 
The educational survey was shared with the PfR Project Working Group 
for their feedback and suggestions and subsequently tested with one person 
from each of four PfR organizations in India, Mali, Guatemala and Indonesia. 
The survey was adjusted based on their feedback, finalized, and translated into 
Spanish and French.  
At the end of November 2019 the survey was sent to the 10 PfR country 
leads and four PfR regional leads, who were asked to introduce the research 
and share the survey with their in-country PfR partners and other CSOs 
involved in the PfR programme. The response time was a little over two 
weeks.  
This resulted in 52 survey responses provided by the different PfR 
partners in eight countries, comprising national Red Cross societies and 
national branches or partners of CARE, Cordaid and Wetlands International. 
In each country, one or more local civil society partner provided responses to 
the survey questions. No one from PfR partner the Red Cross/Red Crescent 
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Climate Centre filled in the survey. Despite several reminders, there were no 
responses from Haiti and South Sudan, possibly due to short response time. 
Examples from South Sudan in the report have been drawn from PfR reports 
and the survey response from the Horn of Africa. 
Participants were requested to indicate their preference in relation to full 
or partial anonymity. To ensure their preferred level of anonymity, the ISS 
team decided to only mention the participants’ country and not their names or 
the specific organization they work for (see Table 1). 
Table 1 
Overview of survey respondents per country  
Country/region Number of surveys Details 
Indonesia 8 4 PfR partners, 4 CSOs 
Uganda 10 
6 PfR partners, 4 CSOs 
including parliamentary forum 
Ethiopia 6 3 PfR partners, 3 CSOs 
India 5 1 PfR partner, 4 CSOs 
Mali 6 4 PfR partners, 2 CSO 
Guatemala 4 3 PfR partners, 1 CSO 
Philippines 5 4 PfR partners, 1 CSO partner 
Kenya 5 4 PfR partners, 1 CSO partner 
Central America regional 
program 
2 CSO partners 
Horn of Africa regional 
program 
1 PfR partner 
 
Follow-up skype interviews based on the survey forms were held with 
six participants – one each from Mali, Guatemala, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia 
and the Philippines. The aim of these interviews was to get further explanation, 
more specific examples and clarifications. 
After drafting the report, a webinar was held with 30 participants from 
PfR (see annex) to discuss and sharpen the conclusions and recommendations. 
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4  Literature review on IRM 
This section introduces core concepts and presents the latest research 
pertaining to the relationships between IRM and conflict. It reviews: 
1. Concepts related to conflict and violence; 
2. IRM, how it is impacted by conflict dynamics and impacts them in turn; 
and the interrelations between conflict and each of the three IRM 
components: climate change, disaster risk, and resource management; 
3. How the implementation of IRM programmes can trigger and exacerbate 
conflict, and which approaches can help avoid these caveats.  
4.1 What is conflict? 
What do we mean by conflict? Conflict occurs when two or more parties find 
their interests incompatible and express hostile attitudes or take actions that 
damage the other party’s ability to pursue their own interests.1 Three main 
components thus characterize what is typically defined as conflict 2: 
1. Goal incompatibility between two or more parties; 
2. Attitudes that arise from this perceived incompatibility; 
3. Conflict behaviour that results from these attitudes. 
The parties may be two countries in the case of inter-state conflict, or a 
national government and insurgent or other societal groups if one looks at 
intra-state conflict or civil war. More broadly, one of the parties might even be 
‘future generations’ in the case natural resources issues.  
The above definition of ‘conflict’ suggests a difference between social 
problems and social conflict. It is a social problem if actors agree that a specific 
issue, which could be poverty or the lack of access to proper irrigation 
infrastructure, needs to be addressed. A social conflict, on the other hand, is 
based on “disagreement between one or more groups due to the perception 
that another group is causing a social problem or preventing other groups from 
achieving their goals”.3  
Conflict is quite common in society, and not necessarily bad. Goal 
incompatibility will always exist, certainly in development endeavours. Parties 
with vested interests may feel threatened by bottom-up development. It is 
important to be cognizant of, understand and work on goal incompatibility, so 
that its effects may be handled as constructively as possible.4 
Conflict studies follow very different strands. Depending on the approach, 
conflict analysis will focus on different scales, from the individual all the way 
 
1 Christian Aid, ‘Integrated Conflict Prevention and Resilience Field Guide’. 
2 Demmers, Theories of Violent Conflict: An Introduction, 5. 
3 Mena, ‘Responding to Socio-Environmental Disasters in High-Intensity Conflict 
Scenarios: Challenges and Legitimation Strategies’. 
4 Cousens, Kumar, and Wermester, Peacebuilding as Politics. 
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up to the globalized world economy. The different levels at which conflict 
takes place must be acknowledged, as must the interrelations between them. 
Kalyvas5 highlights how conflicts are simultaneously driven by local as well as 
overarching agendas, connected through actor alliances across various scales. 
Based on his study of civil wars, he warns against attaching too much 
significance to conflict dynamics at regional or national level in terms of how 
conflict is perceived and works out at the community level. Conflict manifests 
itself in different, semi-autonomous and evolving ways; different types of 
conflicts co-exist, each with its own dynamics, but also influencing one 
another.6 It is thus important to take the specific dynamics of conflict at 
community level as the starting point, rather than conflicts at large. 
Violence 
Violence is part of conflict. It is most often associated with physical acts 
resulting in killings, injuries, kidnapping, forced displacement or destruction. 
But think tanks such as the Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict 
Research also take into account the threat of violence when they determine 
conflict intensity.7  
Moreover, Galtung directs our attention towards structural violence and 
cultural violence.8 Structural violence refers to processes whereby one groups 
oppresses another through structural means, such as an exclusion from 
educational or economic opportunities or restrictions of freedom of assembly 
and speech by a policy or a law. Cultural violence is the broader semi-
permanent state through which some forms of physical violence and structural 
violence are considered as legitimate. Embedded in religion, ideology, language, 
art, and sciences, structural violence exerted by the majority is perceived as 
normal and acceptable, even when this concerns physical violence.9 On the 
contrary, minorities’ violence will be de-legitimized or even demonized, for 
instance by using the label of terrorism. This is where discourses and actors 
such as the media come into play, for instance further fuelling the conflict.  
Beyond acts of direct violence, laws, policies and discourses, authors such 
as Hilhorst10 also highlight the everyday politics – the “quiet, mundane, and 
subtle expressions and acts that are rarely organized and direct”– through 
which actions can be obstructed. Access to specific areas can for instance be 
bureaucratically reduced by losing track or delaying travel authorization 
processes, as has occurred for instance when humanitarian actors have tried to 
operate in non-government held areas in Myanmar.11  
 
5 ‘The Ontology of “Political Violence”: Action and Identity in Civil Wars’. 
6 Demmers, Theories of Violent Conflict: An Introduction. 
7 HIIK, ‘Conflict Barometer 2018’. 
8 ‘Part II: Conflict Theory’. 
9 Herman and Chomsky, ‘A Propaganda Model’. 
10 Disaster, Conflict and Society in Crises, 232. 
11 Desportes, ‘Getting Relief to Marginalised Minorities’. 
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Conflict intensity and scenarios 
Conflict can be categorized in a multitude of ways, for instance depending on 
the parties involved, the level at which conflict plays out (micro/meso/macro-
level conflict, local/regional/national/supra-national conflict), and the 
intensity or impact of violence. Humanitarian actors have found a 
differentiation between high-intensity, low-intensity and post-conflict scenarios 
useful to distil key challenges and strategies to engage with local realities in 
conflict settings.12 While physical violence and lack of state control over larger 
parts of the territory characterize high-intensity conflict,13 societal polarization 
and structural violence are prevalent in low-intensity conflict settings.14 For 
post-conflict, an agreement or political settlement has been established and a 
period of institutional transitions and changes has begun, but tensions may still 
linger where not all conflict parties and topics have been included in the 
settlement.15 It goes without saying that the intensity of conflict may be 
experienced differently on the ground. The Palestinian conflict for instance 
may be qualified as ‘low-intensity conflict’ because annual casualties are under 
1000, a threshold commonly used by think tanks such as the Human Security 
Report Project.16 Yet, the population living under occupation perceive the 
conflict as a dominant factor in their lives.   
Figure 1 
Different types of violence 
 
Source: Christian Aid 17 
 
 
12 Voorst and Hilhorst, ‘Humanitarian Action in Disaster and Conflict Settings 
Insights of an Expert Panel’. 
13 Mena, ‘Responding to Socio-Environmental Disasters in High-Intensity Conflict 
Scenarios: Challenges and Legitimation Strategies’. 
14 Azar, The Management of Protracted Social Conflict: Theory and and Cases. 
15 Melis, ‘The Fragile State of Disaster Response: Understanding Aid-State-Society 
Relations in Post-Conflict Settings’. 
16 ‘Human Security Report Project: Our Work’. 
17 Christian Aid, ‘Integrated Conflict Prevention and Resilience Field Guide’, 3. 
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Summary 
• Conflict differs from social problems: in the case of conflict, parties 
disagree based on perceptions of other groups being the cause of 
problems, and they act to hamper the each other’s interests. 
• Conflict goes hand in hand with violence, which can take the form of 
physical violence, structural violence and cultural violence, as illustrated in 
Figure 1. 
• Conflict unfolds at different scales, showing different but inter-related 
dynamics. Community-level conflicts are influenced by conflict at other 
scales but have their own dynamics. 
• Conflict is of varying intensity: high-intensity war-like situations, low-
intensity situations where structural and cultural violence overshadows 
physical violence, and post-conflict situations characterized by lingering 
tensions.  
4.2 Conflict and IRM 
Originating in business studies and further developed in environmental and 
development studies, IRM stresses the importance of treating risk not in terms 
of particular uncertainties, but as interrelations between several uncertainties.18 
It hinges on in-depth systematic analysis of socio-environmental dynamics 
across various interdependent scales.19 When applied to strengthen community 
resilience, it specifically consists in the integration of climate change adaption 
and environmental management and restoration in DRR. Past research on the 
PfR programme in Ethiopia illustrates how this translates in the following core 
activities, listed in Table 2.  
Climate change, disasters and resource management are inter-related with 
conflict. Conflict and instability contribute to people’s vulnerability to disasters 
and environmental degradation, and vice versa. Furthermore, projects on 
DRR, climate change adaption and environmental management and restoration 
themselves have the potential to create or worsen conflict, but also to make a 
positive contribution.  
The following sub-sections focus on how implementation of IRM projects 
in conflict-affected settings can be affected by and can feed back into conflict 
dynamics. 
 
 
 
18 Miller, ‘A Framework for Integrated Risk Management in International Business’. 
19 Berkes and Ross, ‘Community Resilience’. 
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Table 2 
PfR Ethiopia categories of interventions 
 
Source: Hilhorst et al. 20 
 
Conflict and climate change 
Many scholars have found the relationship between climate change and 
conflict to be significant. Climate change and increasing climate variability lead 
to resource competition, with the potential to increase conflict.21 Hsiang et al.22 
and Hsiang and Burke23 found that extreme rainfall and temperatures increase 
conflict and decrease social stability. Migration is another key factor.24 
Environmental changes can force people to migrate as a coping mechanism,25 
 
20 Hilhorst, Desportes, and de Milliano, ‘Humanitarian Governance and Resilience 
Building’. 
21 Buhaug, ‘Climate Change and Conflict’; Burrows and Kinney, ‘Exploring the 
Climate Change, Migration and Conflict Nexus.’; Ide, ‘Why Do Conflicts over Scarce 
Renewable Resources Turn Violent?’; Mach et al., ‘Climate as a Risk Factor for Armed 
Conflict’. 
22 Hsiang, Burke, and Miguel, ‘Quantifying the Influence of Climate on Human 
Conflict’. 
23 Hsiang and Burke, ‘Climate, Conflict, and Social Stability’. 
24 Burrows and Kinney, ‘Exploring the Climate Change, Migration and Conflict 
Nexus.’ 
25 Henry, Schoumaker, and Beauchemin, ‘The Impact of Rainfall on the First Out-
Migration’; Laczko and International Organization for Migration, Migration, 
Environment and Climate Change. 
 
19 
 
as for instance happens following worsening conditions of wetlands in the 
Sahel.26 Spill-over effects from mass migration can exacerbate existing intra- 
and interstate disputes,27 for example when mass migration compounds 
perceptions of resource scarcity in receiving areas, leading to ethnic tensions 
and marginalization of certain groups.28  
Recent years have yielded a wealth of empirical evidence on conflict and 
climate change. Looking at 46 African countries29 and looking at the 
Philippines,30 scholars found that weather shocks affecting agriculture 
increased the number of (local) conflicts.  
However, the nexus between conflict and climate change has also been 
highly debated by scholars and practitioners. The field of conflict and climate 
change research is still evolving, and at the moment seems to focus especially 
on civil wars and high-intensity violence, rather than for example conflict at the 
local level.  
Some evidence shows no direct relationship between climate change and 
conflict.31 These authors are not so much arguing against a link but have 
shown that the relationship is more complicated than a direct causality. In an 
encompassing assessment of research made up to 2019, multiple scholars32 
agree that drivers other than climate change are substantially more influential, 
including “low socioeconomic development and low capabilities of the state”. 
Socio-political variables, such as economic and political instability, strongly 
influence the relationship between climate change and conflict.33 This is also 
why climate change affects regions differently. If a country is more politically 
stable, it is more likely to peacefully resolve resource shortages.34 
Therefore, understanding and addressing conflict dynamics and political 
instability is crucial when working on climate and environment related projects 
in fragile socio-political contexts. Climate change adaptation responses have 
 
26 Wetlands International, ‘Water Shocks: Wetlands and Human Migration in the 
Sahel’. 
27 Reuveny, ‘Climate Change-Induced Migration and Violent Conflict’; Abel et al., 
‘Climate, Conflict and Forced Migration.’ 
28 Raleigh, Jordan, and Salehyan, ‘Assessing the Impact of Climate Change on 
Migration and Conflict’; Brzoska and Fröhlich, ‘Climate Change, Migration and 
Violent Conflict: Vulnerabilities, Pathways and Adaptation Strategies.’ 
29 Harari and Ferrara, ‘Conflict, Climate, and Cells’. 
30 Crost et al., ‘Climate Change, Agricultural Production and Civil Conflict’. 
31 Bernauer, Böhmelt, and Koubi, ‘Environmental Changes and Violent Conflict’; 
Buhaug et al., ‘One Effect to Rule Them All?’; Salehyan, ‘From Climate Change to 
Conflict?’; Scheffran et al., ‘Climate Change and Violent Conflict’; Theisen, Gleditsch, 
and Buhaug, ‘Is Climate Change a Driver of Armed Conflict?’; van Weezel, ‘On 
Climate and Conflict’. 
32 Mach et al., ‘Climate as a Risk Factor for Armed Conflict.’, 193. 
33 Gleditsch and Urdal, ‘Ecoviolence? Links Between Population Growth, 
Environmental Scarcity and Violent Conflict in Thomas Homer-Dixon’s Work’; 
Hauge and Ellingsen, ‘Beyond Environmental Scarcity’; Koubi, ‘Climate Change and 
Conflict’; Urdal, ‘People vs. Malthus’. 
34 Koubi, ‘Climate Change and Conflict’. 
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the potential to exacerbate conflict.35 Sovacool warns that adaptation projects 
have been co-opted and are trapping people in insecurity, increasing 
inequalities.36 Furthermore, when climate change instigates more extreme 
weather events in regions that are already challenged socio-politically and 
economically, the impact and response crystallize and exacerbate socio-political 
factors.  
Conflict and disasters 
Research has shown the intricate relationship between conflicts and disasters, 
with disasters causing conflict and conflict contributing to the creation of 
disasters. Drury and Olson37 found a relationship between conflict and political 
unrest. And although some argue these relationships are weak,38 the co-
occurrence of disasters and conflict is strong. Between 1998 and 2004, 140 
disasters occurred in complex emergencies.39 Between 2005 and 2009, over 
50% of people affected by disasters lived in fragile and conflict-affected 
states.40 More recently, these findings have been confirmed by Peters and 
Budimir,41 who show that 50% of disaster casualties and 30% of disaster 
affected people are in the top 30 of fragile and conflict-affected states. 
The effect of disaster on conflict (including a possible reduction in 
conflict, as happened in Aceh after the 2004 tsunami), depends on a variety of 
factors. Notable among these are the strength oof the government response42 
or the level of DRR investment.43 Factors such as weak government capacity 
and political instability underlie both the likelihood of disasters and conflict. 
For example, Flint and De Waal44 showed that the Darfur crisis exacerbated 
slow-onset disaster. It is important to understand the socio-political and 
economic factors that put people at risk,45 and to realise that conflict can 
exacerbate vulnerability to disasters as it erodes response capacity over time.46 
 
35 Hunsberger, Work, and Herre, ‘Linking Climate Change Strategies and Land 
Conflicts in Cambodia’. 
36 Sovacool, ‘Bamboo Beating Bandits’. 
37 Drury and Olson, ‘Disasters and Political Unrest: An Empirical Investigation’. 
38 Bergholt and Lujala, ‘Climate-Related Natural Disasters, Economic Growth, and 
Armed Civil Conflict’; Nel and Righarts, ‘Natural Disasters and the Risk of Violent 
Civil Conflict’; Omelicheva, ‘Natural Disasters’; Slettebak, ‘Don’t Blame the Weather! 
Climate-Related Natural Disasters and Civil Conflict’. 
39 Kellet and Sparks, ‘Disaster Risk Reduction: Spending Where It Should Count’. 
40 Buchanan-Smith and Christoplos, ‘Natural Disasters amid Complex Political 
Emergencies.’ 
41 Peters and Budimir, ‘When Disasters and Conflict Collide: Facts and Figures’. 
42 Gawronski and Olson, ‘Disasters as Crisis Triggers for Critical Junctures?’ 
43 Cohen and Werker, ‘The Political Economy of ``Natural’’ Disasters’; Oliver-Smith, 
‘Anthropological Research on Hazards and Disasters’. 
44 Flint and De Waal, Darfur. 
45 Wisner et al., At Risk: Natural Hazards, People’s Vulnerability and Disasters. 
46 Bankoff, Frerks, and Hilhorst, Mapping Vulnerability. 
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Research has further shown that different types of conflict affect disaster 
response and DRR in different ways.47 In high-intensity conflict areas, the 
population is often impoverished, vulnerable and sometimes even displaced 
following years of stagnating development and state negligence. Disaster 
management and humanitarian aid is challenged by insecurity, reduced access, 
and the difficulties of reaching people in need.48 In low-intensity conflict settings, 
key challenges encountered by disaster responders are bureaucratic access and 
project restrictions, and blame and legitimacy games relating to the 
politicization and instrumentalization of aid. These settings offer greater 
possibilities for local action compared to high-intensity conflict settings, but 
also certain pitfalls related to that, because local actors are also positioned 
within the conflict.49 In post-conflict areas, the history of conflict has increased 
vulnerabilities whereas the present is characterized by institutional instability 
and post-conflict politics. Aid actors working in these contexts are confronted 
with coordination challenges, bureaucracy and corruption and find it difficult 
to support the state in its response; this undermines its legitimacy and 
potentially aggravates tensions between the state and society, and enduring 
institutional vulnerabilities.50  
Conflict and resource management 
Many scholars have argued that resource scarcity and competition can increase 
the likelihood of conflict.51 Others have shown that changes in natural resource 
availability or environmental degradation contributed to complex 
emergencies,52 and that violence over land and water resources is widespread.53 
Ide, for example, argues that the higher the level of resource appropriation, the 
higher the likelihood of conflict.54  
Resource scarcity does not always create conflict, however. Societies that 
are able to adapt can find different modes of livelihood, with conflict being 
one of the outcomes, but not the only one.55 Therefore, contextual factors are, 
again, important in understanding the relationship between resources and 
 
47 Hilhorst et al., ‘Disaster Response and Humanitarian Aid in Different Conflict 
Scenarios.’ 
48 Mena, ‘Responding to Socio-Environmental Disasters in High-Intensity Conflict 
Scenarios: Challenges and Legitimation Strategies’. 
49 Desportes, ‘Getting Relief to Marginalised Minorities’; Desportes, Mandefro, and 
Hilhorst, ‘The Humanitarian Theatre – Drought Response in 2016 Low-Intensity 
Conflict Ethiopia’. 
50 Melis, ‘The Fragile State of Disaster Response: Understanding Aid-State-Society 
Relations in Post-Conflict Settings’. 
51 Homer-Dixon, ‘Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict’; Kahl, States, Scarcity, 
and Civil Strife in the Developing World; Peluso and Watts, Violent Environments. 
52 Flint and De Waal, Darfur. 
53 Gleick, ‘Water and Conflict’; Heijmans et al., ‘A Grassroots Perspective on Risks 
Stemming from Disasters and Conflict’. 
54 Ide, ‘Why Do Conflicts Over Scarce Renewable Resources Turn Violent?’ 
55 Hendrix and Glaser, ‘Trends and Triggers’. 
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conflict. Socio-political and economic factors make conflict over resources 
more likely.56 In a socio-political context with high inequalities, ‘resource 
capture’ can allow elites to control resources at the cost of others.57 The co-
management of resources can provide opportunities for dealing with resource 
conflicts, but can also create new conflicts, worsen old ones, or result in 
strengthening control instead of sharing power.58 Conflict mitigation is 
therefore a crucial component in resource management programmes.  
Summary 
• The relationships between conflict, climate change, disasters and 
resource management are significant put highly debated, with 
causalities rarely being direct. 
• The following aspects highlight that attention to conflict is crucial 
for IRM programmes: 
o Climate change increases risk for conflicts, mostly via resource 
competition and migration. Social, political and economic factors 
influence how the linkage takes form. 
o Disasters and conflict often co-occur, leading to ‘complex 
emergencies’. Conflict exacerbates vulnerabilities to disasters and 
erodes response capacities. Conversely, disasters can exacerbate 
conflict, but in some cases have led to conflict resolution. 
o Lack of resources, especially of land and water, leads to conflict 
and violence. But again, the socio-political and economic context 
matters. Elite capture of resources exacerbates the risk of conflict, 
but providing alternative livelihood opportunities and co-
managing resources can avert this. In all cases, it is important to 
scrutinize power-relations at a micro-level.  
4.3 Conflict-sensitive project implementation 
Development projects impact the places and communities where they are 
implemented. Often beneficial, they can also have adverse consequences, such 
as producing or exacerbating social conflict.59 Some of these conflicts relate to 
disputes over the benefits of the projects and how they will be distributed – 
which members of the community will take part in the project, or where 
infrastructure will be built. In other cases, projects do not take into account the 
social history and dynamics of the places where they intervene, thus 
exacerbating existing conflict. Sometimes, projects can create new conflicts. 
 
56 Buhaug et al., ‘One Effect to Rule Them All?’ 
57 Homer-Dixon, ‘Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict’. 
58 Castro and Nielsen, ‘Indigenous People and Co-Management’. 
59 Homer-Dixon, ‘Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict’; Ide, ‘Why Do 
Conflicts over Scarce Renewable Resources Turn Violent?’; MacFarlane, 
‘Humanitarian Action and Conflict’; Wisner, ‘Violent Conflict, Natural Hazards and 
Disaster’. 
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For example, by building infrastructure that reduces the risk of floods for one 
community, a project could modify the course or availability of river water for 
others, risking conflict between up- and down-stream communities.60 
Setting project content and modalities 
Research shows that although many aid and development actors are aware of 
social conflict in the places were projects are implemented, they may be less 
aware of the conflicts that their own projects can produce or exacerbate.61 This 
is often linked to how projects are planned or prepared. Development actors 
may have been working in an area for years and trust their ‘gut feeling’ when it 
comes to managing and preventing conflict.62 Yet, participatory and 
consultation strategies tend to create a sense of agreement, especially when 
they lead to projects that create public and shared benefits, and may not 
predict the divisions that can arise.63 When engaging in such activities, it is also 
important to take into account existing power relations within a community 
and with other stakeholders. Communities are not homogeneous places: “Axes 
of inequality, differences of identity, and power relations make places subject 
to multiple experiences, not a unitary, evenly shared ‘sense’. Within any one 
place, social actors become subjected to multiple matrices of power”.64 This 
should be taken into account, for instance, when setting up community 
committees in charge of project co-design and implementation – does the 
committee represent the diverse interests and experiences of community 
members, or does it not reinforce existing inequalities?65  
Conflict-sensitive programming and conflict risk reduction 
Many humanitarian and development programmes adhere to a ‘do no harm’ 
approach that aims to be sensitive to conflict in order to avoid having a 
negative impact.66 Often, development projects take this a step further and aim 
to reduce conflict risks, or even resolve ongoing conflict (see Box 1).  
 
60 Desportes, ‘Learning from and about Partners for Resilience Ethiopia’; Heijmans, 
‘Risky Encounters’; Mena, Hilhorst, and Peters, ‘Disaster Risk Reduction and 
Protracted Violent Conflict: The Case of Afghanistan’. 
61 Mena and Afghanistan Resilience Consortium (ARC) ‘Understanding and 
Preventing Social Conflict While Implementing Community- Based Disaster Risk 
Reduction in Afghanistan’. 
62 Ibid.; Mena, Hilhorst, and Peters, ‘Disaster Risk Reduction and Protracted Violent 
Conflict: The Case of Afghanistan’. 
63 Moser and Stein, ‘Implementing Urban Participatory Climate Change Adaptation 
Appraisals’. 
64 Moore, Suffering for Territory: Race, Place and Power in Zimbabwe., 21. 
65 Desportes, ‘Learning from and about Partners for Resilience Ethiopia’, 45. 
66 Anderson, Do No Harm; Desportes, ‘Learning from and about Partners for 
Resilience Ethiopia’; Mena, Hilhorst, and Peters, ‘Disaster Risk Reduction and 
Protracted Violent Conflict: The Case of Afghanistan’. 
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Box 1 
Conflict-sensitive approach vs conflict risk reduction 
Conflict sensitivity refers to the ability of an organization to:  
1. Understand the conflict dynamics in the context in which they operate, particularly with 
respect to intergroup relations;  
2. Understand the interaction between the intervention and the conflict dynamics in the 
specific context;  
3. Act upon this understanding in order to avoid negative impacts and maximize positive 
impacts of the intervention (on the conflict dynamics).  
 
To work on conflict risk reduction, a fourth ability is needed: 
4. To make deliberate efforts to address drivers of conflict and to contribute to stability and 
conflict risk reduction.  
 
This can be translated into two different programming strategies:  
a) A focus on doing no harm (avoiding negative impacts by working, for example, in an 
inclusive manner), or on maximizing the positive effects on stability without changing the 
primary objectives of the project/programme; 
b) Deliberately designing objectives of the project/programme to have an impact on 
improving stability (i.e. work on conflict risk reduction, peace dialogue). 
Source: Based on USAID definitions, cited by Cordaid 67 
 
These approaches need to be taken in all the phases of projects, from 
proposal, to planning, implementation and evaluation.68  
Multiple strategies can be used to develop a conflict sensitivity or conflict 
risk reduction strategy. One is to develop and include conflict analysis tools in 
project planning and implementation.69 Mapping stakeholder relationships, the 
conflict tree, or the connectors and dividers analysis are some example of tools 
that seek to enable the collection of sufficient information to avoid, mitigate 
and reduce the risk of conflict.70 Another strategy is to include conflict risk 
reduction strategies or even a conflict resolution mechanism in the project.  
On this matter, however, the literature warns about not confusing peace-
building processes with conflict risk reduction, sensitivity, or resolution 
strategies (see Box 1).71 Although all these processes are related, peacebuilding 
 
67 Cordaid, ‘Enhancing Resilience in Fragile and Conflict-Affected Contexts’. 
68 CARE International, ‘Applying Conflict Sensitivity at Project Level’; Garred, 
‘Conflic Sensitivity En Emergencies: Learnin from the Asia Tsunami Response’; 
Mena, Hilhorst, and Peters, ‘Disaster Risk Reduction and Protracted Violent Conflict: 
The Case of Afghanistan’. 
69 GPPAC, ‘Conflict Analysis Framework: Field Guidelines & Procedures’; Mena and 
ARC, ‘Manual on Conflict Analysis Tools: Preventing, Mitigating and Reducing the 
Risk of Social Conflict in Civil DRR Projects’. 
70 See for example the Massive Online Open Course (MOOC) on ‘When disaster 
meets conflict’; https://www.coursera.org/learn/whendisastermeetsconflict 
71 Woodrow and Chigas, ‘A Distinction with a Difference: Conflict Sensitivity and 
Peacebuilding’. 
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and the resolution of major conflict requires specific techniques to address 
conflict, as opposed to preventing or being sensitive to working in conflict 
scenarios. Some distinguish between how conflict sensitivity aims to support 
working in conflict, while peacebuilding enables working on conflict.72 
Peacebuilding usually requires organizational experience and staff specialized in 
peacebuilding, which most aid and humanitarian aid organizations may not 
have. Taking a peacebuilding approach may even clash with their mandate.73  
In relation to conflict-sensitive programming, engaging with issues such as 
gender, minority groups and CSOs deserves particular attention.  
Gender and minority groups 
Vulnerability to disasters and climate change is different for men and women; 
it also varies within different social groups which collectively identify around 
core characteristics such as ethnic origin, religion, culture, class or language.74 
Indeed, different groups and individuals have differential access to land, water 
and other resources that are vital to integrated risk management, and may be 
treated differently by the state and society (especially in conflict contexts). In 
most societies, women are subordinated to men and have less access to 
resources. Their specific vulnerabilities can be compounded through ‘gender-
blind’ disaster policies and practices.75 Similarly, marginalized groups such as 
landless people, single parents, or discriminated minorities present different 
vulnerabilities and often have less access to resources. This impacts, and often 
lowers, their coping capacities at crisis moments such as disasters or sudden 
eruptions of violence.76 As a result, resource-based conflicts may emerge within 
households or communities, which become even more problematic as women 
and marginalized groups may be less capable to assert their rights and interests.  
Civil society strengthening 
Building on decades of in-country experience, CSOs are commonly more 
knowledgeable and better versed in navigating conflict contexts than their 
international NGO counterparts.77 They often know how to read community 
conflict dynamics and interact with state officials.78 They are also impacted by 
conflict in different ways, particularly where they aim to change the status quo 
or redress situations of suffering and injustice, where they take a strong stance 
 
72 Goodhand, A Synthesis Report; Mena, Hilhorst, and Peters, ‘Disaster Risk 
Reduction and Protracted Violent Conflict: The Case of Afghanistan’. 
73 Woodrow and Chigas, ‘A Distinction with a Difference: Conflict Sensitivity and 
Peacebuilding’. 
74 Azar, The Management of Protracted Social Conflict: Theory and and Cases. 
75 Enarson and Fordham, ‘From Women’s Needs to Women’s Rights in Disasters.’ 
76 Scheper-Hughes, ‘Katrina’. 
77 Matelski, ‘Constructing Civil Society in Myanmar: Struggles for Local Change and 
Global Recognition’. 
78 Desaine, The Politics of Silence. 
 
26 
 
or perhaps face repression and authoritarian state practices. As a result of 
conflict, violence or restrictions, CSO staff members can face trauma and 
personal risk,79 yet they are embedded in their social and professional networks 
and so ‘just leaving’ when the security situation warrants their exit is not 
straightforward.  
International NGOs (INGOs) working in partnership with CSOs need to 
be aware of these differentiated dynamics and risks and support CSOs in 
dealing with them. Aid organizations are increasingly vocal about unequal 
treatment of international and national staff concerning risk transfer, risk 
exposure, security provision and insurance.80 Also, there can be a gap between 
field realities and the plans aid actors might devise in sheltered offices, 
sometimes thousands of kilometres away. As a Myanmar CSO staff member 
states (cited in De Geoffroy and Grunewald),81 “While the international 
community is guided by deadlines and guidelines, local actors here are caught 
between front lines and ethnic lines.” This gap is compounded by the power 
imbalances which often characterize the relations between international and 
national staff.82 
Summary 
• Development projects can trigger or exacerbate conflict as they are 
implemented in communities and their ecosystems. Disputes over project 
benefits deserve particular attention.  
• Development projects can engage with conflict in different ways, from 
working in conflict (conflict-sensitive programming) to working on conflict 
(conflict resolution). The latter necessitates specific approaches and skills, 
which development organizations do not necessarily have, or which might 
even clash with their mandate.  
• Conflict-sensitive programming is to be applied to all project phases, from 
design to monitoring. Specific conflict analysis and participatory tools 
support the process but must be implemented bearing in mind existing 
power (im)balances.  
• Conflict-sensitive programming necessitates particular attention to gender 
and minorities. These are differently impacted and most often more 
vulnerable to disasters and climate change. Programmes must take into 
account their needs and their lower capacities to assert their interests.  
• CSOs and INGOs engage with conflict differently: CSOs are more 
directly embedded in the conflict which means they can navigate it better, 
but their staff are also much more at risk of physical harm and pressure. 
 
79 Drew, ‘Myanmar Case Study: Impact of Conflict on CSOs’. 
80 Egeland, Harmer, and Stoddard, ‘To Stay and Deliver. Good Practice for 
Humanitarians in Complex Security Environments’; Pauletto, ‘The Shocking Inequity 
In Foreign Aid Nobody Talks About’; The Guardian, ‘Secret Aid Worker’. 
81 ‘More than the Money - Localization in Practice’, 1. 
82 Fassin, ‘Humanitarianism as a Politics of Life’; Shutt, ‘Power in Aid Relationships’. 
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INGOs need to support CSOs in dealing with these risks. This this means 
attending to risk prevention and security measures, insurance, and unequal 
power relations between INGO and CSO staff. 
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5 Findings 
In this chapter we present our findings based on an analysis of the survey 
outcomes complemented by the skype interviews and information from the 
‘conflict diary’ (from PfR annual country reports).  
The findings are clustered according to the different thematic sections of 
the educational survey, which relate in turn to the research questions.  
Section 5.1, resource-based conflicts in PfR areas, reports on 
experiences of PfR with conflicts over natural resources, within and between 
communities, and between communities and government or private 
companies. Section 5.2, violence, provides the findings on the different types 
of violence (large-scale, physical, threats, structural and cultural violence) 
experienced by PfR and how this impacts IRM. These sections address the first 
two research questions: 
1. In what ways does PfR encounter conflicts and social tensions in its 
activities, both in the communities of intervention as well as in the IRM 
dialogues with government authorities and private companies at local, 
national and regional levels? 
2. What are the effects of these conflicts and social tensions on our IRM 
approach? 
3. They also partially relate to research questions 3 and 4:  
4. How does an IRM approach affect conflict dynamics in intended and 
unintended ways? 
5. How are these effects differentiated for men and women, other genders, 
people of different castes, ethnicities, livelihoods etc?  
Section 5.3, gender and marginalized groups, reports findings on how 
PfR partners ensure inclusion of women and marginalized groups and what 
challenges or unintended side-effects they experience in doing so. 
This section partially relates to research questions 3 and 4. 
Section 5.4, conflict sensitivity in PfR, describes how PfR monitors 
ongoing or recurring conflicts, what methods and tools they use and which 
challenges they encounter when using these methods. It also reports on how 
PfR country teams deal with conflict, how they work on conflict resolution and 
conflict sensitive programming, and what challenges they encounter. Finally, 
this section reports on the impact of PfR on conflict and vice versa, the impact 
of conflict on the PfR programme.  
This relates to research questions 5 and 6: 
1. What have PfR’s strategies been for dealing with conflict, and with what 
results? 
2. What opportunities are there for better integrating a conflict-sensitive 
approach and/or conflict risk reduction approach in IRM?  
Finally, section 5.5, discussing, reporting and seeking support for  
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conflict-related challenges, describes PfR partners’ experiences with 
reporting on conflict and discussing this with NL-based partners and the NL 
Embassy in their country or region. This section also lists recommendations 
provided by research participants on what the NL Embassy could do to 
support them in case of conflict. It ends with recommendations provided by 
PfR on how to better integrate conflict in the PfR programme, including how 
to increase programming on conflict resolution and peacebuilding within the 
overall resilience framework of IRM.  
This section addresses research question 6 and provides inputs for the 
recommendations of the study.  
5.1 Resource-based conflicts in PfR areas  
The first cluster of findings concerns the resource-based conflicts encountered 
in PfR areas. 
Conflicts related to natural resources within and between 
communities  
More than 40 research participants provide examples of conflicts within and 
between communities related to the access, availability and usage of natural 
resources such as land, water and forest resources. Examples are provided 
from all the countries represented in the survey. 
A very common type of conflict in the examples provided is conflict 
between different types of users of natural resources. In Mali, conflicts 
between farmers, pastoralists and fishermen over land and water resources are 
apparently common, and in Uganda similar conflicts between farmers and 
pastoralists are reported. In Ethiopia, as well as in Kenya and Mali, there are 
also conflicts among pastoralists of different communities competing over the 
use of grazing lands. Examples from the Philippines include conflicts between 
upstream mining communities and downstream communities experiencing 
water pollution from the mines. In India, conflicts mainly concern water use, 
for example fishing communities accusing farmers of excessive water 
exploitation for irrigation. In Indonesia, multiple examples concern conflicts 
between upstream and downstream communities over water use. 
Most of the examples presented in the survey responses concern 
conflicting interests that did not lead to physical violence. Yet, in some PfR 
areas, physical violence does play a role. For example, a participant from Mali 
relates a land dispute between two villages in the commune of Nema Badenya 
Kado which left many people dead or imprisoned.  
Many examples show that these conflicts are usually more complicated 
than merely competing interests over natural resources. Conflicts can become 
sharper when they happen between groups with different ethnic or other 
identities, like in the example above on Mali.  
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 Table 3  
Examples of conflicts 
Countries Types of conflict 
Mali Conflicts between farmers, pastoralists and fishermen over 
land and water resources 
Uganda Conflicts between farmers and pastoralists  
Ethiopia, as well as in 
Kenya and Mali 
Conflicts among pastoralists of different communities 
competing over grazing lands 
Philippines Conflicts between upstream mining communities and 
downstream communities experiencing pollution from the 
mines 
India 
 
Conflicts mainly concern water use, for example fishermen 
accusing farmers of excessive water exploitation for 
irrigation 
Indonesia Multiple examples concern conflicts between upstream and 
downstream communities over water use 
 
A number of responses pay specific attention to inequalities, gender and 
marginality as factors that can play a role in resource-based conflicts. Power 
inequality plays a role, such as in India, where 
there is often conflict between communities with respect to the distribution of 
and access to water resources. […] People with more resources, access that water 
excessively for agriculture, while those with no resources have no way to access 
the water. 
Rich people here, the participant says, “have a greater access and control 
over government (subsidy) schemes, even within the same community. The 
voice of the poor has never reached the policy and decision-making level.”  
An example from Ethiopia concerned how flower-producing communities 
extracting water from the fast-drying lake affect local communities in the Rift 
valley basin. In Guatemala, for example, a participant reports that 
“machismo/violence against women and problems with gender equity are very 
common in the communities, and conflict is generated when the women start 
to participate in decision-making processes”.  
Many of the conflicts have layers relating to communities with a different 
legal status or differentiated entitlements. In Ethiopia, there are examples 
where conflict was exacerbated because different communities belonged to 
different administrative regions. This is especially complicated as one 
participant explains, because “there is no clear borderline between villages. 
This creates conflict during resource mapping. The pastoral grazing system 
boundary doesn’t coincide with government administrative boundaries.”  
In the Philippines, one example concerned a city where urban poor 
communities and formal gated and titled communities are in close proximity. 
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Often they have differing and opposite interests, as the latter views the former as 
nuisance and hindrance to a more secure and safe environment. Since informal 
settlements are located in high risk areas in communities like riverbanks, they are 
blamed for clogging the river ways and worsening flooding in the communities. 
In Kenya there has been conflict in the recent past within communities in 
Laikipia County (a PfR focus area) arising from inequitable water allocation 
and distribution. “This coupled, with clanism and poor governance of water 
projects, has led to conflicts when available water is insufficient to meet needs 
of communities.”  
Another example from the Philippines concerns Lumad communities in 
Mindanao who “have evacuated to municipal centres due to forced 
displacement, and are treated as outsiders by locals and looked down upon”. 
However, as one of the participants from Uganda relates, situations of 
displacement can have different outcomes. This person refers to long-lasting 
conflicting interests between pastoralists and agricultural communities: while in 
two communities the pastoralists were chased away, others opted to 
accommodate them and devised rules and regulations for living. “So the 
pastoralists sold milk and the host community sold other food items. In some 
cases they exchanged goods”. 
There are a number of examples in which the conflict is not about 
material user interests but rather about different views on the importance of 
natural resource management, sometimes intertwined with government 
conservation policies. A complex case from the Philippines concerns conflict 
between fishermen engaging in sustainable fishing and other fishermen who 
want to continue destructive fishing practices. In this case, the conflict 
escalated when the “folks leading the protection strategy reported the 
destructive fishing practices to ‘sea wards’ of the local police; after which they 
had to pay fines. The fishermen then became violent and started threatening 
with guns.” In this case, PfR was able to mediate to avoid further escalation.  
In Uganda, conflicts happen “when the host community of a (natural) 
resource would like to exploit them… while other communities advocate for 
ecosystem management and environmental conservations.” One specific 
example concerns a conflict between timber traders and conservationists in the 
Karamoja region: 
Timber traders cut trees to make charcoal to sell in Kampala and even as far as 
Kenya. In one case, Community-based trainers started to monitor and report 
charcoal traders. The charcoal traders did not want their business to end as CBTs 
were campaigning against illegal and indiscriminate cutting of shea nut trees in 
Otuke. 
A final element that recurs in a number of responses is the importance of 
government regulations – highlighted more often in their absence. One 
participant from Mali implied that violent outcomes were related to a lack of 
institutions that could resolve such conflicts: “conflict can occur in case the 
Peulh grazes their animals in the fields of Bambara; and there will be conflict 
because justice is often hardly done”. A participant from the Philippines states 
that  
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conflict in different communities…arises when community/local government 
mitigation actions are done separately with no coordination. For example, 
rampant waste disposal in river ways from upstream areas and lack of regulations 
will negate any actions and programmes done by downstream communities for 
rehabilitation.  
An example from Indonesia concerns a village fund that was managed by 
the head of the village who discriminated between different farmer groups in 
the allocation of the funds. A conflict from the Central America Regional 
Programme concerns a “women’s association that has been assigned caretaker 
of a protected area by the Ministry of Environment and the local people 
continue to practice tree cutting and pollution of the watershed.”  
Conflicting interests between communities and government or 
private companies over natural resources  
There are many incidences where communities compete with private 
companies over resources. In Guatemala, for example, there are recurring 
conflicts between communities and companies of extensive agriculture that 
engage in river diversion and poorly disposed agrochemical waste. In Ethiopia 
and Kenya, flower companies compete for water with communities, and in 
Mali participants relate how “fishermen want to open a dam to let fish pass, 
whereas the industrialists close the valves for professional purposes”.  
A key issue in the stories concerns the roles of the government. 
Many examples from the different countries convey that governments tend to 
favour the interests of private companies over those of communities. In a 
number of these cases, the government itself is engaged in (commercial) 
resource exploitation, such as in India where governments’ mining of rare 
minerals causes pollution in communities, whereas in most cases the 
government is seen to side with private companies.  
In Guatemala, communities protest the government’s continued issuing of 
permits to private companies to cut down trees in a nature reserve or water 
catchment area. In the Philippines, in Manila Bay, the government has 
approved the building of an airport which will negatively affect the livelihoods 
of communities in the area. In Navotas City, fishermen are denied access to 
their livelihoods as a result of a coastal infrastructure project of the city 
government in partnership with the private sector.  
In Indonesia, there was a resource-based conflict in Fatuleu Mountain 
where the Tourism sector of the district government allocated a large amount 
of money to build infrastructures for tourism without involving the 
communities. In India, land or forest is often allocated to industries, whereas 
local communities are denied access to the forest, or are even prosecuted for 
entering their nearby forest area. In Ethiopia, communities living in the 
Abijata-Shalla Lakes National Park clash with the park management. In 
Uganda, pastoralist dry-season grazing areas near the Awash river have been 
allocated by the government to large-scale sugar cane plantation.  
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In a number of cases, these conflicts turn violent. In Guatemala, 
competition between companies and communities comes with “criminalization 
of community leaders, damage to private property, threats and contracting cuts 
of local labour”. In Kenya, when pastoralists in Laikipia invaded private 
ranches to search for water and pasture during a prolonged drought, the 
national security police shot and killed over 300 cattle.83 In the Philippines, the 
conflict between Lumad indigenous communities and multinational companies 
has taken the form of a total conflict. The Lumad seek to defend their 
ancestral land against the encroachment of multinational corporations engaged 
in mining, logging or large plantation activities. These companies are supported 
by national and local government units including the state security forces, as 
well as paramilitary units. The government frames the resource conflicts as an 
ideological fight between democracy and communist terrorism, demonizing the 
legitimate claim of Lumad to their ancestral land. The conflict also creates 
divisions within communities, as many Lumad are recruited, often under 
threat, to become members of paramilitary units, creating fear and violence. 
Where governments have policies for resource management, this can work 
for or against communities. In India, communities may feel dispossessed from 
their forest-based livelihoods. A complicated issue arises in the Philippines 
where urban poor communities reside in unsafe locations, such as riverbanks, 
that have been identified as no-build zones. Relocation programmes are not 
participatory and lead to people being located far from livelihood 
opportunities, and so families tend to return to the city and resume living in at-
risk places. There are a number of examples in which the government does not 
uphold its resource management policies. In Guatemala, “it is common that, in 
the absence of law enforcement people or companies take advantage of the 
inaction of the authorities responsible for nature protection leading to 
degradation of the forest through encroachment of agriculture and livestock”. 
A participant from Mali refers to “corruption of judges, slow return on 
verdicts, and poor governance”.  
Some participants point to a lack of accountability towards local 
communities. Somebody from Guatemala notes that “the most common 
conflicts [result from] big decisions on the use of natural resource…taken at a 
desk at the central level and away from the real priorities and needs of the 
communities”. In Uganda, a participant reports that “the state of emergency 
declared by the communities is not taken serious by the government. This is 
because such information blown to the outside may have political implications 
on the serving government.” 
There are some positive examples. In the Philippines, an example is given 
where a mayor intervened when government officials condoned illegal fishing 
in a protected area. In Kenya, protest against the large-scale dam built as part 
of the Lamu Port South Sudan Ethiopia Transport Corridor project led to a 
court order to financially compensate communities for destruction of their 
 
83 https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2001259299/hundreds-of-cattle-killed-
in-police-operation-in-laikipia 
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livelihood sources, while in Isiolo County the government had to put on hold 
the Construction of a ‘mega dam’ on the Ewaso Ngi’ro River.  
There are also examples where PfR interventions succeeded in resolving 
conflicts, such as in Indonesia, where the conflict around tourism referred to 
above was resolved through the development of a village tourism action plan 
based on the landscape approach, a point we will come back to below. 
Finally, survey respondents from Ethiopia, India, the Horn of Africa, 
Guatemala and Indonesia mention that conflicting interest between factions, 
government agencies or political parties have spilled over to the communities 
and led to conflicts.  
Summary 
• PfR mainly experiences conflicts in relation to access, availability and 
usage of natural resources such as land, water and forest resources. These 
resource-based conflicts occur between different communities (e.g. 
farmers, pastoralists and fishermen) or between local communities and 
government or the private sector. Many of these conflicts have layers 
relating to communities with a different legal status or differentiated 
entitlements. Inequalities related to wealth, power, gender and marginality 
fuel resource-based conflicts. 
• Governments tend to favour the interests of private companies over the 
interests of the community in natural resources. In some cases, the 
government itself is engaged in (commercial) resource exploitation. Lack 
of government regulation or law enforcement can exacerbate resource-
based conflicts. 
5.2 Violence 
This section focuses on the intensity and types of conflict with violence as 
experienced by PfR: large-scale violence, incidents of physical violence, threats 
of violence and associated uncertainty, structural violence, and cultural 
violence.  
Large-scale violence 
All countries and regions represented in the survey presented different types of 
violent conflict interacting with or affecting PfR work. However, in countries 
like Mali, Guatemala and South Sudan, PfR suffers the most from large-scale 
violence occurring at the national or regional level leading to overall insecurity 
which hampers everything. In these countries, large-scale violence and 
insecurity “have diminished the possibilities for movement of the PfR team, 
which inevitably gives rise to a monitoring problem”. This also restricts the 
general implementation of the programmes. 
Generalized violence can also create tensions in the governance structure 
at the regional and local level, resulting in levels of uncertainty with regard to 
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authorization or support that threatens the sustainability of programmes. This 
is the case in Mali, Guatemala and the Philippines. In this last case, an example 
is presented where local elections have “created a level of uncertainty in this 
period of transition to regional autonomy”. 
Sometimes, large-scale violence does not affect the programmes directly, 
but shifts the focus of governments and the context in which projects are 
implemented such that there is little room left for IRM. For example, in South 
Sudan, the authorities are prioritizing programmes that contribute directly to 
peacebuilding, or the general violence in the country has degraded markets and 
the wider economy to levels that make it difficult for communities to focus on 
IRM projects. 
Incidents of physical violence occurring in areas where PfR works 
While large-scale conflict is a reality in a number of countries, a greater number 
of examples relate to incidents of physical violence in areas where PfR works. 
Examples can be found in every country where PfR is working, but with 
differences. In Ethiopia, Kenya, South Sudan, the Philippines and India, 
violence usually occurs between communities based on ethical, religious or 
political differences. In Mali and Guatemala, on the other hand, the examples 
are related to organized crime and armed conflict. For instance, “incidents of 
violence in the Mopti region (Mali) have prevented certain activities of the PfR. 
Incidents of violence have also disturbed environmental education in the 
department.” In the case of Guatemala, death threats and killings are common. 
As mentioned in the survey and follow-up interview, two community leaders 
from where the PfR programme is implemented have been murdered. 
None of the examples provided are about violence against PfR staff 
members or project implementors but rather the affects on community 
partners and people in areas where projects are implemented. For instance, in 
India: 
Chennai community members were very violent as they did not have water for 
their daily consumption. When the local authorities, NGOs, tried to supply the 
community groups with water using delivery tanks, there were reportedly a 
number of acts of violence in order to get more water. 
A typical consequence of physical violence is forced migration, which 
further affects the implementation of projects. In Ethiopia, for example, 
“conflict between different ethnic groups led to internal displacement in 
different parts of the country. Over 1 million people are internally displaced.” 
The Philippines also has a similar situation: “Lumad communities are forced to 
leave their homes and farmlands and evacuate to neighbouring municipalities 
for months (some even years) at a time, until it is safe for them to return.” In 
India and South Sudan, displacement has also been a regular issue. 
In the case of India and the Philippines, disasters such as cyclones, 
earthquakes, floods and droughts are also mentioned as a factor producing 
displacement or aggravating the effects of violent conflict.  
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Threats of violence 
The presence of the threat of violence can also severely affect PfR work and 
the communities where projects are implemented. Although these threats do 
not target PfR projects directly, the mere presence compels the programme to 
act carefully, primarily when it relates to partners that have been threatened. 
For instance, in the Philippines: 
CARE and partner ACCORD have been vilified by the military and in social 
media by unknown groups as supporters of the Communist Party of the 
Philippines and its armed wing the New People’s Army… Many NGOs and 
INGOs have been included in the most recent list published by the military. This 
threat is attributed to humanitarian assistance being extended by NGOs and 
INGOs to IDPs perceived as supporters of the communists. 
In other places, like in Guatemala, death threats often play a role and PfR 
members need to be careful not to become a target, as one participant notes. 
An example shows how threats work: “In most cases, they are anonymous, to 
intimidate people who exercise their right to protest. These [threats] are so 
frequent that in many cases they manage to paralyse the protest over the levels 
of insecurity in the region.”  
Structural and cultural violence  
The notion of structural violence resonated with many participants and is seen 
to play a role in most countries where PfR is active. This type of violence 
usually concerns processes by which a group oppresses another through 
structural means, such as exclusion from education or economic opportunities 
or restrictions of freedom of assembly and speech. 
Most examples of structural violence point to the general legislation of a 
country, including regulations and laws at the local level, which usually affect 
the most marginalized. In the case of the Philippines, a participant notes there 
are a lot of laws and policies that maintain or aggravate marginalization: 
Laws on control of resources and economy are for the benefit of big businesses 
and the small group of the most powerful and wealthiest in the Philippines. This 
is of national scale but has everyday effects on the most vulnerable in PfR areas 
as this perpetuates the state of poverty that they have been experiencing for 
many decades.  
India and Mali also present examples of legislation detrimental to the most 
marginalized groups.  
A form of structural violence mentioned in every country is that which 
affects women. In Uganda, this especially harms women “who lack access to 
productive resources like land and are thus excluded from economic 
opportunities from agriculture”. Structural violence against women is also 
presented as a typical example of cultural violence. Cultural violence is a semi-
permanent state through which some forms of physical violence and structural 
violence are considered as legitimate, especially by the majority; for example, 
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through ideology, religion or social stratification. Minority violence in reaction 
to these structural problems will often be considered illegitimate. 
Mali presents an excellent example of the interrelation of cultural and 
structural violence. A participant mentions how the imposition of Sharia law 
has overtaken national legislation in some areas, “imposing the use of veils by 
women, the prohibition of playing music to young people and also the 
prohibition of wedding festivities”. A response from Indonesia provides an 
example of how violence against woman has a cultural aspect, as “the 
Timorese generally live in a patriarchal culture, which places women in the 
position of second class [citizens], which has an impact on access and 
participation in decision making”. 
Other examples of cultural violence that indirectly affect PfR work are the 
caste structure in India, the violent imposition of tribal norms in parts of the 
Philippines, or discrimination against indigenous people in Guatemala.  
Forms of violent conflict affect the implementation of PfR projects in 
every country, directly or indirectly. Several participants stressed the 
importance of carefully managing the reality that the work of PfR can itself be 
a source of threat or direct violence. This also has implications for the issues 
that can be raised, and some issues need to be avoided despite the impact they 
have on IRM. For example, a participant from Guatemala, notes that the 
pervasiveness of gang violence and gang structures in a community prevents 
people from participating in awareness-raising processes. 
This can also lead to exclusion of relevant stakeholders, like in the 
Philippines, where the current government administration is accused of 
branding civil society activists and advocates as terrorists or communists: “Due 
to this, many of these organizations are targeted for intimidation and more 
often than not have little to no opportunity to be involved in the consultation 
and participatory processes that the government has.” 
Summary 
1. PfR partners in all countries experience violent conflict interacting with or 
affecting PfR work.  
2. Mali, Guatemala and South Sudan suffer the most from the kind of large-
scale violence that leads to generalized insecurity; this constrains PfR staff 
movement and restricts the general implementation of the programmes. 
3. Violence affects PfR community partners and others in PfR areas, but 
there were no examples of violence against PfR staff.  
4. Disasters producing displacement can aggravate the effects of violent 
conflict. 
5. Structural and cultural violence, mainly against women, is experienced by 
PfR partners in all countries. 
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5.3 Gender and marginalized groups  
This section describes how and to what degree PfR ensures the inclusion of 
women and marginalized groups in the programme and what challenges are 
encountered. It also examines how interventions might have unintended 
effects that exacerbate social problems or conflict.  
As mentioned in the section above, PfR in all countries experience 
‘structural violence’ against women through ‘structural means’, such as 
exclusion from education or economic opportunities. 
Research participants were strongly convinced of the importance of 
bringing out women and marginalized groups’ voices, given that needs and 
interests differ. In Guatemala for instance, water access in wetlands is 
particularly important for women (and benefit the entire household), whereas 
men emphasize their interest in farming. In Mali, women are traditionally 
excluded from landownership and in India lower castes are not allowed land 
titles and are discriminated against over-use of resources.  
The bulk of the statements relates to specific programme approaches and 
tools which allow for marginalized groups and women to be involved 
throughout project management cycles. Such approaches and tools were cited 
by members of all eight countries and Horn of Africa regional programme 
participants. Some PfR partners use specific methods and tools from their 
‘mother organizations’ such as the Gender Action Learning System (CARE 
International, implemented by PfR Uganda) or the Protection, Gender and 
Inclusion minimum standards (International Federation of the Red Cross, 
implemented by PfR Indonesia). Other partners, such as in Kenya, rely on 
Participatory Disaster Risk Assessments to analyse risks for different social, 
economic, gender and age groups. All these tools enable projects to apply a 
specific gender lens, to work out ‘family visions’ (as reported in Uganda), to 
break down how each group is rendered vulnerable in different ways and can 
be included.  
A Ugandan participant notes the importance of balancing male and female 
PfR staff and training staff on gender issues and tools. A participant from Mali 
highlights the importance of frequently emphasizing the need to have all voices 
heard, including when doing baseline surveys and engaging at field level. 
Results should be frequently monitored, according to a Horn of Africa staff 
member. 
One common approach is to make sure that women and marginalized 
groups with special interests are present in the meetings where needs are 
assessed and decisions taken. In Mali for instance, the issue of “gender and 
marginalized groups was taken into account in the composition of the various 
committees”. Women are part of the various livelihood groups (agriculture, 
livestock, fishing, forest), in accordance with the national gender law quota of 
30%. But in Mali there also is a specific women’s group, which works on issues 
such as administrative authorizations and ultimately women’s access to 
agricultural land.  
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Participants report very practical steps to make that sure women, young 
people and marginalized groups attend and speak at these meetings: ensure 
physical access to meeting locations (the Philippines), pay increased attention 
to information flows (the Philippines), invite participants in a targeted 
deliberate way, allocate speaking time (Kenya), use attendance sheets which 
disaggregated biodata with gender and age (Uganda), and work with quotas 
(Mali). Concerning quotas, a Kenya participant also says: “In all our meetings, 
workshops and training, we make sure that 30% of the participants must be 
women and other marginalized group like persons living with disabilities.”  
Participants also detail facilitation techniques which help to bring out 
usually silent or weak voices. Separate meetings are often held with women 
only, sometimes as first step before mixed meetings. At these follow-up mixed 
meetings, women can then bring their perceptions and priorities forward more 
clearly, as a participant from India explains:  
Including women and marginalized groups in PfR programme is important as 
both have different needs. At the initial level…we separate household meetings 
and later hold group meetings…with these groups. That makes their priority and 
perception clearer. 
Similarly, in the Philippines, it is acknowledged that pre-engagement 
results in women being “better recognized for their contribution and 
engagement in men-led activities, which range from income generation to 
decision making”. In Indonesia, women developed Women Community 
Action Plans, which were then presented at the village development plan 
meeting. But follow-up meetings can also be of use. This was applied in 
Indonesia, where “special classes” were held to accommodate women and 
other marginalized groups who were less vocal in large meetings.  
Respondents suggest that capacity-building of marginalized groups and 
especially women is often a necessary pre-step for effective participation. 
Training and information sessions are thus conducted in Guatemala, Kenya 
and Mali on topics as diverse as women’s rights, self-advocacy, IRM advocacy 
and land rights. In Mali, youth groups are specifically involved on the issue of 
climate, via the ‘Y Adapt’ and the ‘Y Adapt for Scouts’ educational modules 
developed by the Red Cross Climate Centre.  
Another way to make sure women’s voices are heard is to have women 
placed in policy and management positions and on decision-making bodies 
from the local to regional scales, as reported in Mali, Kenya, Guatemala, 
Indonesia and South Sudan. Such bodies included the formulation team of 
village development plans (Indonesia), water resource user associations 
(Kenya), or the Kinnaite Technical Wetlands Working Group (in South Sudan 
– the secretary of that working group was a representative of a war widow’s 
group).  
However, men and non-marginalized groups should certainly not be left 
aside in these endeavours, as reported for India and Indonesia. In Indonesia, 
the Laki-laki Baru or ‘new male’ movement aims to “maximize women’s roles 
in public sphere as well as domestic issues” while men are to be “more 
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sensitive to women’s involvement in development”. Trainings are also offered 
to men and boys on the topic of gender.  
Another strategy indicated by participants is related to advocacy and policy 
work in order to influence government work plans and budgeting. In Kenya, 
the PfR team advocated the development of the Youth, Women and Persons 
with Disability Bill, now in place for Isiolo county. In Mali, women’s access to 
land was a central point of advocacy efforts. Policy and advocacy work is done 
by training government officials on ‘gender responsiveness’ or through gender 
working groups, such as in Indonesia. But a participant from India also 
explained how marginalized women were involved as much as possible. 
Women were to interact with decision-makers, either directly or through 
consensual video recording, which were then shared in various fora.  
Further strategies mentioned by some included: appointing ‘community 
champions’ to “assist in mobilization of marginalized groups and actively 
involving them in dialogues” (India); engaging in partnership building (India); 
and engaging in more ‘symbolic’ activities to overcome gender stereotypes, 
such as “involving the men in the weaving of the purun [grass] mat with the 
group” (Indonesia). A Philippine participant highlights how, in work with 
farmers and cooperatives, it was not only important to involve men and 
women equally, but also to ensure that the farm earnings were equitably split 
between them.  
While gender-inclusive approaches are thus widely adopted, two further 
findings stand out. First, only one participant from Kenya pointed out how 
representing different interests and voices was particularly important in 
situations of conflict, while no other responses made reference to conflict-
sensitive gender approaches. Second, participants’ statements predominantly 
focus on women. Ethnic groups and castes are mentioned only rarely. The 
more extensive lists of “women and men, boys and girls, older people, persons 
with disabilities, and other vulnerable groups (e.g. pregnant and lactating 
women)” and “women, girls, persons with a disability, minority groups” were 
mentioned for Indonesia and the Philippines respectively. The latter is 
particularly important in view of the findings on conflict, where many 
examples highlighted socio-economic and cultural inequality as conflict 
dynamics. 
Challenges and negative unintended side-effects of involving 
women and marginalized groups 
As presented in Table 4, 15 of the 52 participants reported challenges and/or 
negative consequences. The responses can be grouped into four major 
challenges or unintended side-effects.  
A first difficulty is that partners may try to involve women, but women 
often lack the voice, literacy and language skills to participate and speak 
for their own interests. Difficulties are heightened when women are also part 
of an ethnic group with lower socio-economic status, as reported in Mali.  
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Relying on interpreters and facilitators can partly help resolve these issues, 
but participants also explained how such means were expensive, time-
consuming, and not always effective: “some messages get lost in translation” 
(Kenya participant). Facilitation suited to the specific context and situation – 
including splitting up groups for discussions and bringing them back together, 
as put forward by a participant from the Philippines – also necessitates special 
skills.  
Table 4  
Countries with participants reporting challenges and/or negative consequences  
of involving women and marginalized groups  
Country/region Number of participants reporting challenges  
and/or negative consequences 
Mali 3 
Philippines 2 
Uganda  2 
India  2 
Indonesia 2 
Kenya  2 
Guatemala  1 
Central America  1 
 
 
A second reported side-effect of women’s empowerment and skills-
building was women taking over ever more responsibilities and tasks. One 
Uganda participant expressed it as women becoming “victims of burden”:  
The women perform well and have increased knowledge, income and started to 
invest in construction of permanent houses or better houses. Some of their 
husbands take advantage of them and load them with more responsibilities of 
paying school fees, medical bills among others. 
Third, in the Philippines and Guatemala, participants working with 
specific community groups reported increased defiance by authorities 
and/or communities. This makes it harder to build relationships with 
communities and increases security risks. In the Philippines, participants 
reported dealing with such risks and restricted movement as follows:  
Stricter security protocols are put in place in areas and projects that is identified 
as high risk in terms of safety, and close coordination with the local government 
and other civil society organizations in the area are ensured. 
Fourth, in Mali, Kenya and Guatemala, it was reported that men felt left 
out after women-only meetings were held. In reaction to this, special 
meetings were held explaining why women-only spaces were necessary. These 
discussions focused on the specific conditions of men and women and how 
these result from societal structures (Guatemala). Such exchanges could be 
tense but overall led to increased acceptance, although in Kenya they also 
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ended up allowing some men to participate in previously women-only 
meetings.  
Summary 
1. Research participants were convinced of the importance of bringing out 
women and marginalized groups’ voices, given that needs and interests 
differ.  
2. They recommend context-appropriate tools and programme approaches 
that enable projects to apply a specific gender lens and allow for 
marginalized groups and women to be involved throughout project 
management cycles. 
3. The most commonly mentioned approaches include: reaching a balance 
between male and female PfR staff and training them on gender issues and 
tools; making sure all voices are heard, such as in baseline surveys and 
during field trips; regularly monitoring results; making sure that women 
and other marginalized groups are present in meetings throughout 
decision-making process.  
4. Building the capacity of marginalized groups, especially women, was 
presented as a necessary pre-step for effective participation, as was 
advocacy and policy work to influence government work plans and 
budgeting. 
5. Another way to make sure women’s voices are heard is to have women 
placed in policy and management positions and in decision-making bodies 
from the local to the regional scales, and to engage men and non-
marginalized groups in training on gender topics. 
6. While gender-inclusive approaches are widely adopted, less attention is 
generally given to ethnic groups and castes.  
7. While most organizations are aware of the need to focus on women, less 
attention is given to the gender dimensions of conflict. Only one 
participant (Kenya) pointed out how representing different interests and 
voices was particular important in situations of conflict. Responses did not 
refer to conflict-sensitive gender approaches. 
8. Four major challenges or unintended side-effects of gender-inclusive 
programmes emerged:  
9. women often lack the voice, literacy and language skills to participate and 
speak up for their own interests.  
10. A side-effect of women empowerment and skills building was that women 
took over ever-more responsibilities and tasks. They become “victims of 
burden”. 
11. Participants working with specific community groups reported increased 
defiance by authorities and/or communities. 
12. in Mali, Kenya and Guatemala, it was reported that men felt left out after 
women-only meetings were held. 
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5.4 Conflict sensitivity in PfR  
This section deals with policies, approaches, methods and tools that PfR 
partners use to monitor evolving or recurring conflicts and what challenges 
they encounter in doing so. It also reports on how PfR partners work on 
conflict-sensitive programming and conflict resolution. Finally, it reports on 
the impact of PfR on conflict and vice versa.  
We first asked participants if their organizations had a ‘do no harm’ policy. 
A majority (31 of 44) of participants who responded reported that they did (see 
Table 5). Most of these (26) are national country offices or branches of CARE, 
Cordaid and the Red Cross, the other five are in-country CSO partners. Only 
seven respondents reported they did not have such a policy. Six participants 
didn’t know whether there was a policy, which could either mean their 
organization has not communicated its policy sufficiently or that such a policy 
does not exist.  
Organizations with a do-no-harm policy use it as a guiding principle for 
their programme development and implementation. For example, in the 
Philippines the policy is integrated into the organization’s overall code of 
conduct. In Mali partners work on the basis of “fundamental principles of do-
no-harm in humanitarian intervention”. 
Table 5 
PfR partners per country with a do-no-harm policy 
Country Yes No Maybe No answer 
Mali 7    
Indonesia 5  1  
Uganda 5 2 1  
Ethiopia 3 1 2  
Philippines 4    
India 3 1   
Guatemala 1 1 1  
Kenya  2 2 1  
Central Africa 1    
Total 31 7 6 8 
 
We asked further questions on their methods and tools for monitoring 
(evolving) conflict, if and how they do conflict-sensitive programming, and if 
and how they work on conflict resolution. The survey responses show that in 
practice, many such tools and methods overlap.  
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Monitoring conflict through consultation with stakeholders at 
different levels 
Participants elaborated on how evolving conflicts are monitored and 
addressed. The main approach used across the board, with different nuances, is 
participatory, involving consultations and dialogues.  
Dialogue is seen as yielding the best results, as it creates empathy for the 
other party’s stance, and may dissipate escalation. This preference was 
expressed in Guatemala, for example: “there is very little tolerance towards a 
confrontational method. Instead, community meetings or stakeholder 
dialogues are used to reach agreement.” A staff member in the Philippines 
explains:  
The process is protracted but not confrontational. The capacity building of 
vulnerable sectors as well as local government authorities allows the creation of 
larger spaces for participation where duty-bearers and rights-holders are able to 
resolve some, but not all issues. Capacity building as an advocacy strategy opens 
doors that allow for more sustained dialogue, which is not possible in more 
confrontational type of advocacy activities. 
The participant notes, however, that this approach takes time and does 
not always result in positive outcomes. A line needs to be drawn when the 
interests of the vulnerable groups are harmed, and a more confrontational 
approach is mandated.  
Community meetings and stakeholder dialogues can strengthen 
relationships between different users of natural resources, such as up- and 
down-stream communities, or between officials who might need to “put 
everything on the table and start having an open discussion amongst 
themselves”, as noted in Indonesia. Dialogue is often used to connect 
communities with officials, as in Ethiopia: “We connected the community 
organizations to the relevant government authorities and investors to discuss 
their issues. Enabling, accompanying and connecting were used as a strategy to 
influence the relevant stakeholders.”  
Dialogue meetings are seen as crucial to increase understanding between 
parties: “It is important to know what each of the parties thinks and to 
understand that not only do they have a problem, but that there is another 
party that also feels affected.” Dialogue can enable parties to “move forward in 
synergy” (Guatemala), but they need to take place regularly in order to pay 
attention to sensitivities (Indonesia). 
Dialogues are generally held with different types of stakeholders: ethnic 
groups, local councils, resource users’ associations, CSOs, village savings and 
loans groups, community leaders and institutions, and government officials. 
Sometimes these take place within the formal sectors, at other times 
connecting the communities with the authorities. But they are also crucial to 
strengthen relationships between and within communities. In some countries, 
dialogue is held between the IRM coalition and formal authorities, such as in 
Mali. 
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Meetings and dialogues are often about understanding the other parties, 
finding common interests and seeking agreement (Mali and Indonesia), 
ensuring that conflict parties both benefit from programmes (Kenya and 
Uganda), or highlighting laws and policies (Uganda). In the Philippines, much 
focus is given to knowledge sharing to enhance the understanding of the 
relationship between natural resources, hazards, climate, livelihoods and risk 
for future. The meetings and dialogues are generally found to be quite 
successful. For example, in Indonesia, “After the consultation process, tension 
between the related stakeholders began to ease, resulting in better and 
participative conference of DRR Forum.” 
Other methods to further the dialogue between groups include exchange 
visits for community learning (Uganda), and media talk shows to discuss issues 
(Uganda), consultations leading to signed agreements between armed groups or 
with the population (Mali), and meetings between user groups in resource 
conflicts (Ethiopia and Uganda). Sometimes these activities culminate in a 
forum or advocacy day. In Uganda, an inter-district forum is organized to set 
terms and conditions for seasonal migration. 
An interesting observation was provided from Mali, where PfR enabled 
dialogue by grouping stakeholders according to their livelihoods to avoid them 
primarily identifying themselves along ethnic lines. For instance, fishermen 
discussed their interest together and negotiated with other livelihood groups. 
This put ethnicity into the background and highlighted instead what people 
have in common across ethnic divides.  
It is considered important to link informal discussions to formal ones, 
seeing them not as separate islands but as building blocks. Shifting between 
informal and formal methods decreases the risks related to powerful voices 
overshadowing the less powerful ones:  
Constant discussion and coordination with PfR partners help identify the 
conflicts (and updates) that the communities face. Formal and informal 
discussions provide information that we need, and most of the time results from 
informal discussions support/verify the formal ones. In formal activities, 
discussions are often led and hoarded by the highest official or eldest participant 
in the group, thereby limiting the flow of information. To bring out the concerns 
and voices of those not in power, it is healthy to engage them in informal 
discussions where they can freely express their thoughts and experiences without 
the fear of being shut down or disenfranchised. (Philippines)  
This consultation, the participants stress, needs to happen continuously.  
Assessments, monitoring and continued discussions 
Surveys, assessments, consultations and monitoring are used in the planning 
phase of a project to better understand and increase participation of the 
communities and stakeholders. In areas where there is a lot of activism, such as 
in India, or during particularly conflict-prone seasons, such as the Ethiopia’s 
dry season, these assessments help to understand community perceptions. 
Community risk assessments are also done to identify hazards, assess  
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vulnerabilities and capacities, and devise an action plan. In the Philippines, this 
includes consultations with the national counterpart organizations to 
understand emerging conflicts.  
Evolving conflicts are also monitored through local capacity strengthening 
and increasing understanding by discussions with local partners and PfR 
partners on how to take a ‘do no harm’ and conflict-sensitive approach, and 
how to involve community groups and support community structures to 
resolve conflicts. In Indonesia, these discussions are organized at a national-
level forum with other IRM partners. Policies and frameworks at an 
organizational level “encourage dialogue among members” (Kenya), and 
brainstorming project monitoring and evaluation sessions were found useful to 
continue to address the conflicts as they emerge (Uganda).  
Complaint procedures 
Complaint procedures have become an essential part of the organizational 
toolbox. Some tools are more informal, such as giving contact information to 
community groups so they can contact PfR partners directly, such as in India 
and Uganda, or having staff in the field “collect any emerging issues from 
community and district” as in Uganda. More formal tools include complaint 
procedures shared among different partners (India). PfR provides support for 
organizations to have a complaint procedure, such as in Uganda:  
PfR established the community-based monitoring process. This is a process 
where communities are trained on rights, entitlements and obligations. The 
‘community-based monitors’ collect information through monitoring ‘service 
delivery’ and other aspects of resource-based conflict. The findings are shared 
with duty bearers through a dialogue and recommendations and actions are 
agreed upon.” 
Communities can appeal to the project or to local government. In conflict 
situations, police and the judiciary are often involved, but in certain areas these 
functions are taken over by rebel groups. 
But while these procedures are in place, they are not always used 
successfully. In Indonesia, a participant reports that “So far, no complaints 
have been made either from the community or programme implementation 
partners.” In other countries, the complaint procedures remained limited to the 
level of meetings and raising issues through the local self-governance 
structures, such as in India. Generally, it is an aspect that still requires 
strengthening, as noted by participants from Guatemala and, in the following 
quote, the Philippines: “Complaints procedures are applied in community 
projects, but this is an area we should strengthen as a part of PfR 3 to improve 
staff/partner understanding and application as a basis of capacity building.” 
Remoteness can pose a challenge to these procedures, such as in Uganda:  
Some people are deep in the village and may not have reported their grievances 
due to distance and language or even opportunity to get to staff directly. 
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Conflict-sensitive programming 
Many participants are familiar with a number of tools that enable conflict-
sensitive programming. 
Context analysis, conflict risk assessments and power mapping are 
important tools to generate baseline information for conflict-sensitive 
programming, and some participants include and use ‘conflict risk assessment’ 
as part of their standard assessments for programme design and development.  
CARE has developed a conflict sensitivity toolkit for use in country 
offices and by PfR partners. A ‘community scorecard’ is included to assess 
conflict-risks. Staff from PfR Uganda have been trained in the do-no-harm 
methodology and taken through tools of conflict-sensitive programming. 
Based on the needs expressed by field staff and partners, in 2019 Cordaid 
developed a toolkit for conflict risk analysis and risk reduction, which will be 
introduced to local staff and partners in 2020. This toolkit can support conflict 
risk analysis at the start of a project and conflict risk reduction planning, 
implementation and monitoring. 
Participants mention that context analysis through community risk 
assessment and stakeholder mapping is key to better understanding different 
actor’s roles and engagement in the programme. Conflict risk assessment helps 
PfR partners to anticipate possible situations that may arise and formulate 
contingency plans to help address them.  
Importantly, some participants note that ‘normal’ risk assessment tools 
and methods used for IRM also enable them to understand conflict dynamics 
in the context in which they operate. These include: context analysis; hazard, 
capacity and vulnerability assessments; stakeholder analysis; and the ‘pressure 
and release model’. 
Almost all participants mention the importance of participatory analysis. In 
Ethiopia, participatory risk assessments help to identify “the connectors and 
dividers in the community” and participatory mapping exercises, including with 
relevant government offices, help to identify key resources and resource users. 
Power mapping in Indonesia is done through stakeholder and conflict 
mapping, including special village meetings for women groups. A participatory 
advocacy training manual is seen to promote “inclusive processes that address 
risks that often lead to conflicts either of interest or over resources” in 
Kenya. A participant from the Philippines mentions the use of free, prior and 
informed consent – a specific right that pertains to indigenous peoples and is 
recognized in the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples allowing them to give or withhold consent to a project that may affect 
them or their territories. When there is a new project in Uganda, common 
planning and strategy formulation is done through development of 
Community Action Plans which “clearly address most of the would-be 
concerns of members within the community, such as sharing of responsibilities 
and benefits.” 
Many organizations employ local staff who understand the local context 
and power relations between communities. They carry out the stakeholder 
 
48 
 
analysis that includes understanding the communities’ culture, language, 
political and socio-economic settings.  
Practices and issues with the use of tools 
Mapping tools and power analyses are mostly seen as useful in the planning 
phase:  
This process of power mapping has been the foundation for planning; we have 
been able to work with community structures to engage the leadership following 
understanding of power dynamics. The interest and power mapping is done to 
ensure the advocacy is well targeted. (Uganda) 
Community and interest mapping is done during training, for example by 
using problem trees, and plans are developed based on the results (Mali).  
Respondents find the tools especially useful for knowledge building and in 
the development of strategies. Interest mapping and power analysis in 
advocacy plans are developed in a participatory, inclusive manner, such as in 
Guatemala: “This is important to elaborate in order to understand that maybe 
there are other actors that were left out but may have a decisive role in 
resolving the conflict.”  
Some participants say there is still limited expertise and experience in the 
use of conflict assessment tools and insufficient understanding of the 
interaction between resilience interventions and conflict dynamics.  
Though many apply conflict mapping, implementation needs 
strengthening at different levels. As one participant from the Philippines says: 
“Our practice is not based on experience or strong theoretical foundation, but 
mainly through ‘learning by doing’.”  
Tools are not always used consistently, or their use is too limited scope. 
Power analyses are mostly done at village level, but as one participant 
recognized, “it’s not sufficient as it needs to look inter-village and zonal 
strategies”. Some participants observed that it would be useful to use these 
tools beyond the planning phase. In Kenya, a yearly risk analysis and 
stakeholder mapping is conducted to reflect on – and adjust if necessary – the 
theory of change. 
Research participants mention a number of issues related to conflict-
sensitive programming that help them to avoid negative impacts and maximize 
positive impacts with regard to conflict dynamics. A participant from Ethiopia 
says:  
The focus is on maximizing positive effects on stability without changing the 
objectives of the resilience programme and deliberately designing objectives of 
the resilience programme to have an impact on improving stability. The focus is 
on doing-no-harm by working in an inclusive manner. 
Many participants agree that the tools can facilitate programming but note 
that inclusive planning and engagement in multi-stakeholder dialogues remain 
key. 
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Key elements of conflict-sensitive programming  
Transparent communication is an important element of conflict-sensitive 
programming as it is key to building trust among parties. For example, in 
Uganda, where partners work through common planning with all involved 
groups, a participant advises providing adequate information to all groups, and 
being transparent and accountable: “Help them understand opportunities of 
cooperation in the short and long term.”  
This is echoed by a participant from the Philippines: “We are open, 
transparent, and collaborative, which builds trust. When trust is present, 
community members are more inclined to share their views and observations. 
In this manner, we are able to see where conflicts may arise.”  
Transparent communication helps avoid misinformation with any of the 
stakeholders and to explain trade-offs between communities:  
If you have a project in area X, then make sure that you reach out to the next 
area and explain thoroughly what the project means and what reasons are behind 
the location. Otherwise, it may become difficult for them to embrace it and 
instead harm or cause delays in execution which affects quality of work. (Uganda) 
Another important element is facilitating engagement in multi-stakeholder 
dialogues. For example, in Mali PfR partners facilitate dialogues between 
stakeholders in various stages of programme development and 
implementation. Government and local communities are facilitated to 
participate in multi-stakeholder platforms to air opinions and enable 
understanding and empathy: “Empathy is the key to resolving a conflict: make 
clear that there are not always people who win or lose but rather actions that 
allow normalizing a situation.”  
Understanding conflict dynamics helps communities in conflict to engage 
in dialogue. In India, PfR initiates consultative dialogues between conflict 
groups and assigns arbiters in consultation with those groups. The arbiter is 
oriented to include the needs of lower castes and other marginalized groups. In 
Uganda, dialogues between stakeholders are organized through ‘community 
barazas’ where government officials meet local communities and engage on 
issues that require policy direction from the government. In this process, 
participants say, it is important that organizations “step back and give room for 
the community leaders to engage – this may take time”.  
In the Philippines partners seek dialogue with the government and other 
‘duty bearers’ by looking for spaces to participate in governance, for example 
in the local Peace and Order Council. PfR ensures there is local government 
involvement in the programme. In Kenya, partners strive to understand the 
cultural and political aspects of conflict dynamics through providing a platform 
that is seen as a ‘safe space’ for dialogue. Dialogues are facilitated between local 
communities and government institutions such as the National Water 
Resources Management Authority. 
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Taking it a step further: working on conflict resolution 
In theory and policy, a distinction is made between conflict-sensitive work and 
programming for conflict resolution (see chapter 4). The distinction is not 
always clearly demarcated in practice, and many participants consider their 
work as conflict risk reduction, conflict resolution or even peacebuilding 
activities between different groups in the area they work. This can be at village 
or district level, at the level of a landscape such as Ewaso Nyiro River Basin in 
Kenya or in a whole region, for instance the Inner Niger Delta in Mali. The 
following examples from the practice of PfR are derived from the ‘conflict 
diary’ based on PfR annual country reports and from the survey responses. 
Two examples from different villages in Indonesia illustrate how PfR 
partners work to resolve conflicts:  
the conflict started during the election process of village chief where there was 
misunderstanding on the number of votes. PfR’s approach was building dialogue 
and communication with all groups in the village. PfR perpetually communicated 
with higher authorities who were responsible to resolve the conflict. Although it 
took time finally all parties involved in the conflict agreed to ‘hand over’ the 
problem to the district level government who assigned a staff to act as village 
chief until a new leader was elected. Now, all is back to normal again. 
There was conflict in the forest area in Oelbiteno, a PfR village in Kupang 
district which was resolved by PfR: the forest area was categorized as Industrial 
Forest (Hutan Tanaman Industri) managed by government sector at provincial 
level. The villagers could access firewood and cattle fodder from the forest area 
but could not expand their farming in the forest area. This created conflict. PfR 
introduced ‘breeding cattle in the stall’. The community needed to plant some 
forest plants that could be used for cattle fodder. PfR also encouraged 
community to plant coffee, guava and sweet potato to optimize production. This 
was quite successful as the conflict was seriously reduced. 
In Kenya, the Partners for Resilience organize each year a ‘Camel Caravan’ 
in the Ewaso Nyrio River Basin to bring the conflicting ethnic groups together 
to stand up for their common interests. The Camel Caravan promotes more 
equitable water allocation among all water users (tourist lodges, agro-business, 
farmers, pastoralists) along the river and raises awareness on unsustainable 
water extraction and pollution by mid- and upstream users. PfR partners 
together with county governments facilitate “community peace awareness 
dialogues and campaign on conservation of Ewaso Ngiro River upstream, mid- 
and downstream”.  
Kenya PfR has also conducted inter-community dialogue with different 
stakeholders and managed to facilitate the inter-county peace strategy for 
Isiolo, Laikipia, Samburu and Marsabit counties. 
Warring communities signed a traditional peace accord at Nesarge village in the 
border of Laikipia, Isiolo and Samburu, as a traditional conflict resolution 
mechanism. Signing of the peace agreement among these pastoralist communities 
is crucial in managing risks from inter-community conflicts like cattle rustling  
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especially during droughts. PfR CSO partner together with other CSOs and the 
peace elders from Laikipia, Isiolo and Samburu held a meeting to plan and 
sensitize the communities on the importance of signing the peace accord. 
In Mali, PfR actively works on conflict risk reduction and facilitated the 
establishment of an ‘IRM coalition’ by the different water user groups, farmers, 
fishermen, pastoralists and forest product users in the Inner Niger Delta. 
These groups joined forces to prevent internal conflicts on water and land 
resources and to promote a joint vision in their dialogue with the government 
to advocate sustained water inflow in the Inner Niger Delta (in relation to 
existing and planned hydropower dams upstream).  
Members of this IRM coalition are trained in the IRM concept and 
disseminate criteria and regulations to change water and land use practices at 
community level. PfR has noted that the number of conflicts between different 
water users and conflicts over land has decreased. PfR Mali partners are 
attentive on the cohesion between members of different unions and 
associations and within the IRM coalition.  
In the Philippines:  
In Surigao, through the climate risk assessment exercise with the communities, 
the relationship between mining operations, pollution, water resources, hazards 
and poverty, disasters became crystal clear. PfR partner and local government in 
their aim to reduce conflict started a dialogue with the mining company on 
strategic zoning (protection of water resources and high risk zones, against 
landslides, floods) and to stop mining in certain areas that are most at risk and 
would have greatest impact now and in the future of the municipality. It also 
included looking at the issue of restoration that mining companies are supposed 
to do but often don’t. 
Finally, an example from Uganda shows how media can be used:  
Through our extended work in the media where we do our advocacy, for 
example in mining work, we use mass media to provide information to the public 
that is relevant to conflict resolution. 
 Challenges to conflict monitoring and conflict-sensitive 
programming  
Pro-active monitoring through consultation and dialogue appears the favourite 
and most effective strategy to monitor and address conflict but is not without 
challenges.  
One challenge observed is that conflict-sensitive tools are usually adjusted 
to the local level, whereas PfR works at different levels. PfR partners tend to 
adjust to the situation as it emerges, such as in the Philippines, where the 
programme was able to scale up when working at the village level was not 
sufficient; it was then taken to inter-village and multi-stakeholder level.  
An important limitation of working through dialogues is that PfR often 
cannot address conflicts directly. It was noted that this makes it even more  
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important to combine formal and informal methods of working, as informal 
conversations can yield information about conflict that stay hidden in public 
meetings.  
Methods can be time consuming and therefore costly. For example, in 
Guatemala key challenge is the available time within a workplan to assess 
potential conflict and work on risk reduction: “It can lengthen community 
processes”. In the Philippines, the scattered locations of communities are 
challenging. Participants say that in their initial IRM programme there was no 
budget explicitly allocated for doing conflict risk assessments or engaging in 
risk reduction activities. As a result, conflict risk assessments are not done in all 
PfR areas due to limited funds. In Kenya “mobilization of people to share their 
views is costly in the bid to reach many in far places”. 
Another challenge is to get conflicting parties together. Participants explain that 
some who are unwilling to engage in dialogue or mediation processes. This can 
be for different reasons. In India, for example, some segregated communities 
do not want to engage in dialogue with each other. “PfR had to revise its 
strategy as these heterogeneities have existed for decades. Root causes cannot 
be easily dealt with.” Some research participants mention challenges with the 
village government: “they are sensitive, there is suspicion” (Uganda). 
Many participants flag the challenge of limited or inadequate staff knowledge and 
capacity on conflict-sensitive programming. There is a need to improve staff 
capacities to promote and implement conflict sensitive methods. Some staff 
lack personal skills and abilities for mediation and conflict resolution. Research 
participants mention that they are ‘learning by doing’ and became engaged in 
conflict mitigation and resolution ‘when the need arose’. In addition to capacity 
and skills, neutrality of staff is important when engaging in conflict-sensitive 
programming. A Philippine participant mentions that “staff maybe be 
influenced by the power dynamics and struggle to be able to maintain 
neutrality in process facilitation. We need strong tools and training to assist 
staff and partners.”  
Safety and security risks for staff when they travel to conflict-affected areas 
present another challenge. This was mentioned, for example, by a Philippines 
participant who stressed the importance of ‘staff readiness’ to face and be 
exposed to risks. Staff have to be well informed of the risks that come with the 
work and the organization’s capacity to ensure their safety. Work in conflict 
areas is dynamic and volatile, situations may change any time, so the staff and 
organization “must be flexible, adaptable and have presence of mind”. A 
participant from Mali also notes that staff face many difficulties travelling to 
PfR focus areas due to insecurity.  
High turnover of employees, both in the government and in CSOs, is 
mentioned as a constraint. Institutional memory and carefully nurtured 
relations are easily lost. For example, from Kenya: “In conflicts that involve 
the local government, high staff turnover, replacement or transfers result in 
loss of momentum gained from engaging said officials”. 
In the Philippines the high turnover of organizations’ staff has been 
difficult, not only in relation to IRM capacity “but also on how to deal with the  
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pressures on them, considering that staff are quite young and mostly women, 
and in building the institutional memory on the behaviour in the communities 
and the effects of the project”. 
In Ethiopia, the fast-changing nature of some conflicts require 
organizational flexibility and adaptiveness. During drought periods there can be 
resource-based conflicts; in periods of floods, conflicts can be related to the 
relocation of affected communities. During national election periods there can 
be violent political conflict.  
In relation to this, some participants mention as a constraint the lack of 
donor flexibility in adapting programmes to the realities on the ground.  
In some cases, conflict-sensitive programming alone is not sufficient to 
address conflict dynamics. In Kenya, militia activity is a difficult problem: 
Some ‘normal’ conflicts have become sophisticated, for instance cattle rustling 
becomes a booming business and is supported by powerful people. The NGO 
interventions are not always fruitful; this requires a more strategic engagement 
than a stand-alone programme for peacebuilding and conflict transformation. 
Many indicate that they face resistance from stakeholders “sometimes out of 
ignorance or fear of dis-empowerment (of the dominant party) and there is 
sometimes limited appreciation by stakeholders who think we are being too 
diplomatic in handling the situation” (Indonesia).  
In Guatemala PfR partners experience resistance from some sectors of 
society “due to ignorance or because there are no previous experiences of 
applying conflict-sensitive methods in these communities. The misinformation 
of the people we work with can be a great challenge.”  
Sometimes resistance is rooted in culture: for example, pastoralists 
communities in Kenya, the Samburu, consider cattle rustling as an important 
element in their culture which they don’t want to change. “For a man to marry, 
he must steal cattle.”  
Challenges with conflict resolution 
Challenges in working on conflict resolution are largely the same as those 
encountered in relation to conflict-sensitive programming, such as: limited 
financial resources because partners have not budgeted for conflict resolution 
activities; lack of adequate staff capacities and skills; the challenges of bringing 
conflicting groups together. There are also specific challenges, in particular the 
risk that solutions don’t last.  
Participants from Uganda and Kenya say they have limited reach because 
the activities for conflict mitigation and resolution were not originally planned 
and therefore not budgeted for. There was no budget to organize important 
meetings between specific sub-region community leaders, which resulted in 
increased tension.  
Some research participants say that even when a negotiation results in an 
agreement endorsed by all parties, it may not be long-lasting, and conflict may 
break out again after short period.  
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The challenge has been in sustaining results. Conflicts transform and change face. 
For instance, with the migration of cattle keepers to Otuke, different ones keep 
coming, not the same whom you worked with in the previous year or season are 
involved in negotiations … Sometimes it’s very difficult to bring together the two 
conflicting parties, and some resolutions may not be implemented as planned 
since the two conflicting parties may have a change of mind. (Uganda) 
The Red Cross seems to face some specific challenges in relation to its 
mandate. It is ‘auxiliary’ to the government but in the IRM programme it 
works on empowerment of communities to defend their needs and interest 
even “in case this is against the government policy” (Kenya).  
 Impact of PfR on conflict and vice versa  
One of the questions is whether and PfR interventions can contribute to 
conflict dynamics. This question is difficult to answer, because there is rarely a 
direct causal relation between the interventions and conflict. Nonetheless, 
interventions may contribute indirectly to the conditions that underlie conflict. 
Participants note several of these effects.  
Partners in Ethiopia regularly assess the potential effects of their 
interventions on the dynamics of the conflict, for example by checking if an 
activity is “strengthening the connectors or the dividers in the community”. 
They monitor and adapt the programme to the oft-changing realities on the 
ground, using their Theory of Change.  
One of the PfR partners in Guatemala explains how their IRM 
programme affects conflict dynamics as it touches on sensitive issues such as 
land-use planning and allocation of resources.  
IRM works on promoting spatial planning policy, which is a sensitive issue in the 
country due to the lack of legal certainty of land ownership … The conflict in 
Guatemala is based mainly on organized crime. PfR wants to empower people, 
and that can put them in danger. You have to be careful with those good 
intentions, seeking to empower community leaders and women, and inviting 
them to raise their voice. Of course, this is necessary, but it is also very, very 
dangerous.  
The participant adds that “it is important not to stop implementing the 
programmes, but to conduct carefully, so the programme does not affect the 
beneficiaries or the members of our organization.” 
In Mali, leaders of the IRM coalition facilitate the relocation of people 
from jihadist-controlled villages. They face many challenges, including the 
people’s mistrust of them, which can lead to increased conflict risk.  
In the Philippines, local CSO partners discuss with PfR staff what they 
encounter in the field and what the ‘tendencies’ of the communities are in 
relation to the PfR programme. In Surigao, South Philippines, they see 
negative responses to some of the interventions: “we have to be cautious in 
explaining the programme and not creating false expectations. We need to 
ensure that the interventions are not creating conflicts between communities.” 
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This was also the case in Indonesia, where limited funding for the programme 
caused conflicts between communities. 
Some conflict contexts can be very complex, making it difficult to oversee 
the impacts of programme interventions. A participant from Ethiopia explains:  
In pastoral communities employing conflict-sensitive methods is risky by itself. It 
can produce dangerous consequences in many ways as everybody might 
understand differently. Some will politicize and some others will associate with 
ethnic and the like. So we should work systematically and in collaboration with 
the community based on their interests. 
A case from the Philippines illustrates how programme interventions to 
support local participation in large scale government programmes have to be 
evaluated regularly to prevent unintended negative effects on vulnerable 
groups:  
In the case of the Manila Bay Sustainable Development Master Plan, PfR is 
confronted with highly controversial issues like forced displacement of informal 
settler families (ISFs) from high-risk zones. These displaced families are deprived 
of housing and related basic services (in the name of risk reduction) despite 
existing legislation ensuring rights of ISF and urban poor subjected to 
resettlement. The issue of land reclamation in Manila Bay is a highly contentious 
issue, pitting the ISF and small fishermen against private sector interests working 
with national government. PfR has committed to facilitate community and local 
government units’ participation ensuring their voices are heard in the planning 
process. But participation so far has been token and appears to be used to 
rubber-stamp the plan. If having a place at the table and having their voices 
heard prove impossible, the question to ask would be: is the strategy being used 
by PfR still valid, or should other strategies be put into play? 
A participant from Uganda mentions that PfR can get into ‘conflict’ with 
partners when people engage in activities that PfR considers unsustainable, 
such as charcoal trade and bush burning.  
 
Negative pressure on PfR partners 
We asked if PfR partners or the local CSOs faced increased negative pressure 
from government, the private sector, or other actors as a result of their IRM 
related activities. Of the 52 participants, 48 answered this question.  
When negative pressure was experienced, it mostly derives from 
government institutions and officials with diverging interests. In Guatemala, 
this happened during the revision of the risk management law, where the 
government and the deputies changed the law giving power of civil protection 
to the army. In one part of the Philippines, the government is preventing a 
CSO working at the request of a private company and other stakeholders. In 
Indonesia, the CSO alliance had to step back as it was threatened by 
government elites: an official pressured senior management to withdraw staff. 
Threats to the programme and staff are not uncommon among PfR partners, 
but they are not always reported. Since in Kenya some of these threats might 
originate from government officials, and reports are often shared with these 
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institutions, it is understandable that they limit sharing of these experiences in 
reports.  
Table 6 
Participants who have experienced negative pressure 
Country Yes No 
Mali 2 4 
Indonesia 1 6 
Uganda 1 8 
Ethiopia 0 6 
Philippines 3 3 
India 0 4 
Guatemala 1 3 
Kenya  0 4 
Central America 1 1 
Total 9 39 
 
 
Programmes need to be careful how to deal with these pressures, 
especially when it comes from the government:  
In balancing the interests of poor communities or vulnerable groups, and the 
interest of the local government unit (or the economic interests of the local chief 
executive), we need to be very careful as the local chief executive might close the 
door to us (including literally) if he feels his interests are threatened. This could 
lead to a premature termination of the engagement or dialogue. Meanwhile, 
capacity building of communities will continue, so that they will be capable, on 
their own, to engage the local government unit or chief executive in dialogue on 
specific matters of their interest. (Philippines)  
In Indonesia, while it was considered “a huge step back”, they were able 
to make revisions and have backchannel communication with other 
government officials.  
Another type of negative pressure was seen in harassment from the 
military or militarized groups in the Philippines:  
Staff have been targets of military harassment and intimidation because of 
working with local organizations of marginalized sectors that the government has 
red-tagged. Staff are followed by military forces in plain clothes, suppliers such as 
service providers are interrogated, services and community activities are restricted 
or put on hold, which affects the timeliness and efficiency of delivery.  
To resolve this, the team sought audience with government and military 
officials to explain the projects and activities that will be implemented in 
disputed areas: 
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It is important to maintain a civilian and independent status in providing its 
services to those in need, in accordance to the International Humanitarian Law, 
so access to communities while ensuring staff security is important. Security 
protocols are also put in place for monitoring of staff’s whereabouts, efficient 
work planning and setting up alternative plans. 
Militarized harassment was also found in Mali, as there is “poor law 
enforcement, pressure and ‘roquettes’ from natural resource users”. Resource 
managers are seen to be part of the state and therefore targeted by jihadists.  
Awareness that pressures can mount can lead to framing of the 
programme in a certain way to avoid conflict, as a Philippines participant 
notes: “we are trying to keep a safe space as we dig more into power dynamics 
of water and other natural resources. We have to anticipate, it’s a risky 
business.”  
 
When challenges stand in the way of the IRM programmes 
In some cases, the problems faced can severely affect a programme’s 
effectiveness or lead to its abandonment. Research participants from countries 
including Guatemala, the Philippines and Mali indicate that conflict contexts 
can be too threatening, too large-scale or too complex to address. Some 
indicate that their only option was to downscale or withdraw from a region. In 
Guatemala, after the killing of two community leaders in 2018, the CSO 
partner applied the principle of ‘total caution’ and suspended its staff and all 
activities in the area. The PfR partner stayed in remote contact with the 
communities and with the municipal authorities to ensure that other parts of 
the PfR policy programme were still implemented.  
Contexts of large-scale violence can be too complex for organizations to 
address: “These challenges go beyond the capacity of our organizations as they 
relate to a lack of governance, of law enforcement and the existence of 
criminal structures in the region” (Guatemala).  
Sometimes the long history of violence has resulted in a culture of fear 
among local residents who are wary of speaking out, organizing themselves or 
being involved in any dialogue with other stakeholders. This constrains PfR 
partners from engaging with or mobilizing local communities. In Central 
America, participants see a “widespread culture of violence which does not 
allow a culture of peace to develop effectively, even after more than 25 years of 
peace agreements that ended armed conflicts in the region”.  
Widespread violence can be too threatening for some organizations to act 
upon. As a participant from the Philippines reports:  
In the current political climate of strident anti-human rights rhetoric, shrinking 
democratic space and vilification of human rights, environmental, humanitarian 
and other organizations’ involvement in highly contentious issues such as land 
reclamation, mining, logging, plantation operations can be literally fatal. 
Participants from Uganda mention that in some cases NGOs are being 
targeted for political reasons which leads them to refrain from any involvement  
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in conflict resolution. Some others from Horn of Africa region mention that in 
extreme cases of conflict between stakeholders they refrain from getting 
involved and leave it to the authorities to intervene.  
PfR partners working in these threatening conflict contexts describe 
‘mitigation measures’, such strengthening partnerships with local government 
units, or ensuring close collaboration with international NGOs and with multi-
stakeholder alliances. They also put stricter staff safety and security measures in 
place.  
A number of organizations do not have the legal or organizational 
mandate to address conflict-related issues. For example, in Ethiopia, until 
2018, CSOs were legally not allowed to work actively on conflict resolution. 
However, this legislation has been revised and now civil society actors are 
allowed to engage in and facilitate conflict resolution processes. In some cases 
engagement in conflict resolution can be beyond the mandate of their 
organization or the programme and/or they do not have adequate staff 
capacity, human and financial resources. 
In India, working on conflict resolution can be too sensitive. As a 
participant notes, “civil society actors do not want to offend state governments 
by integrating sensitive matters on conflict in their programmes”.  
Sometimes an organization has to work through a partner on conflict 
resolution, such as in Indonesia: “We know the root causes, the constraints 
and to some extent, the culprits, but we have to work through partner 
organization as we lack confidence to deal with it directly.” 
Participants from Kenya mention that their organization needs to build its 
reputation in conflict resolution as their core business is disaster management 
and community resilience building. 
A Guatemalan participant stresses that PfR partners “far away” do not 
know what is going on in relation to conflict dynamics: “in-country partners 
and CSOs on the ground are the forefront … It might be useful to make a 
guide and be able to teach (PfR partners) how to handle these programmes at 
all levels. They need to learn from us, from the ground, how things need to be 
addressed.”  
A participant from the Philippines reflected:  
In the case of large-scale violence, it always involves a lot of parties and 
stakeholders and the conflict has been standing for several years or decades. It is 
a challenge for CSOs to address this with limited time and resources as socio-
economic factors and issues way beyond the organization or the project’s 
mandate must be resolved. The IRM approach can be a tool for conflict analysis 
and strategies how to address these but ultimately, it is the duty bearers that 
should be the main actor in resolving it. 
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Summary 
• The majority of PfR partner organizations have a ‘do no harm’ policy.  
• PfR partners use a participatory approach with consultations and dialogues 
to monitor conflicts. 
• Surveys and assessment tools are applied to complement consultations 
and increase participation of communities and other stakeholders. 
• PfR partners use context analysis, conflict risk assessments and power 
mapping to generate information for conflict-sensitive programming; 
some include conflict risk assessment as part of their standard assessments 
for programme design and development. 
• Key elements for conflict-sensitive programming are transparent 
communication towards all parties and the use of multi-stakeholder 
dialogues to increase parties’ understanding of conflict dynamics and 
create safe spaces for stakeholders. Examples of initiatives by PfR partners 
include establishing a coalition of different water users (Mali), an annual 
multi-stakeholder event along a river (Kenya), or multi-stakeholder 
dialogues (Philippines, Indonesia). 
• The challenges experienced by PfR partners in conflict monitoring, 
conflict-sensitive programming and conflict resolution are many, 
including: inconsistent use of various tools, or their use is too limited in 
scope; methods can be time consuming and costly; difficulties bringing 
conflicting parties together; limited or inadequate knowledge and capacity 
of staff; safety and security risks; high turnover of employees both in 
government and CSOs; resistance from stakeholder out of ignorance or 
fear of disempowerment. Last but not least, partners flagged the challenge 
of sustaining results. The fast-changing nature of conflicts requires 
flexibility and adaptiveness from organizations. 
• PfR can have a negative impact on conflict either directly or indirectly as it 
promotes IRM which in some countries relate to sensitive issues such as 
planning policies or land ownership. Building advocacy capacities among 
local communities can put them in danger in some contexts. PfR 
programme implementation can create conflict with communities when 
false expectation are raised about project benefits.  
• Nine PfR partners experienced negative pressure from government or the 
private sector as a result of their IRM-related activities. In some cases, 
violence, threats or harassment can lead to the withdrawal of staff, a less 
effective programme or even the abandonment of the work.  
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5.5 Discussing, reporting and seeking support on conflict-
related challenges 
Given the lack of space to talk openly about conflict issues in many settings, 
we asked whether PfR actors discuss or report on conflict-related issues with 
actors like CSOs, PfR colleagues, government officials, communities, and 
donors. 
Most PfR partners discuss issues of conflict and violence related to the 
programme with their colleagues, the communities involved, CSOs and local 
government. This is an opportunity to ask for advice and support from others. 
A research participant from Mali says, “yes, it happens to discuss conflicts 
because it is always in the discussions that the light shines”. Many partners use 
the opportunity of half-yearly PME workshops with in-country PfR partners to 
discuss conflict dynamics and issues related with violence. In India, for 
example, conflict around mining operations is repeatedly raised for discussion 
at these workshops.  
However, in some cases these matters cannot be discussed publicly for 
fear of increasing the threat of violence. In Guatemala, partners decided to be 
very prudent in sharing information so as not to trigger further violent actions:  
Although it is thought that we must act and intervene immediately and directly, 
from personal experience this can trigger violent actions and even the murder of 
other people in the team. The communities and CSOs are mentioned with much 
caution because they are the people who are in the first line (in direct contact or 
closest with the conflict). 
In most other contexts, partners feel that discussing conflict-related issues 
can itself contribute to the reduction of conflict risk. For example, in Mali, 
such discussion has “the aim of contributing to the reduction of social tension 
in order to be able to implement the programme while developing suitable 
strategies”. PfR partners discuss issues of conflict and violence with 
programme stakeholders specifically when this can affect the achievement of 
objectives and goals of the programme. “In some cases, [stakeholders] are part 
of the conflict or otherwise they can be part of the solution, so it is necessary 
to take all actors into account.” 
In some countries, partners have to be cautious in discussions with 
government. For example, in Ethiopia PfR engages “sometimes with 
scepticism”, wary of the possible consequences for the programme. In 
Guatemala partners are hesitant to talk with government officials as: “it is 
known that by levels of corruption and/or state bureaucracy it can be 
counterproductive”. In the Philippines, PfR presents the conflict to the 
government from the perspective of ‘problem resolution’: “they know many of 
the issues but government position is different and their engagement in 
processes is very important. ‘Conflict’ is not a good term in the Philippines so 
has to be communicated carefully”.  
Another participant from the Philippines adds, “We discuss only based on 
appraisal about the openness of the government official to such discussion and 
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the specific topic on conflict”. In Indonesia, partners can discuss these issues 
only with ‘open minded’ government officials.  
Thanks to its ‘neutrality principle’, the Red Cross has much better access 
to senior government officials than many CSOs. In Ethiopia, the Red Cross 
can put issues of conflict on the agenda of the government.  
Many partners put conflict-related issues and violence in their project 
reports, which they share with PfR partners and the donor and in some 
countries also with in-country programme stakeholders. In Kenya, CSO 
partners were threatened during a campaign in which they were facilitating 
dialogues with local stakeholders on a planned hydropower dam upstream in 
the Ewaso Nyiro river. As it was not clear who made the threats, they decided 
to not report on this in the annual report to the donor and PfR partners, so as 
to not put their CSO partners in further jeopardy. In Guatemala, partners 
report to the donors only after analysing the situation, including the potential 
impact of sharing the information.  
 Support from higher-level actors, in particular the Netherlands 
Embassy 
Research participants provide many suggestions on the supportive role they see 
for the NL Embassy in their country or region.  
Participants indicate that NL Embassies could support PfR through 
‘humanitarian diplomacy’ and other dialogue with government officials. In 
their diplomacy activities with the government, the embassy can advocate 
specific conflict resolution or peacebuilding approaches. As a participant from 
Mali says: “the Embassy can advocate for peace so that the state accelerates 
and opens the dialogue”. The embassy can also push governments to address 
systemic issues that cause conflicts. It can issue statements on the Netherlands’ 
position in relation to the conflict or – as it did in Kenya – can bring the issue 
to the attention of the Council of Governors.  
Participants from the Philippines suggest that the NL Embassy could help 
to counteract the vilification and criminalization of civil society organizations 
by promoting the added value of these organizations and partnerships: “[With 
diplomatic partners] not counteracting the vilification, the Philippine 
government is emboldened in its targeting of CSOs”.  
Another suggestion provided is that the embassy can play an active role in 
mediation between government and local stakeholders: “they have access to 
the appropriate ministries in the country and can engage with them to address 
conflict … In the event that the political landscape is not facilitating 
consensus, they can come in” (Uganda).   
It also suggested that they help in further strengthening CSOs’ capacity in 
mediation and conflict resolution. Additionally, they “can support civil society 
partners in conflict situations in other ways such as through financing of micro 
projects and direct activities with community groups to support the revival and 
sustainability of livelihoods and that continue to generate conflicts” 
(Guatemala). 
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In some cases, embassies have established platforms for dialogue at 
national level and facilitated “safe spaces where different actors can talk to 
each other without fear of harassment” (Ethiopia). Respondents suggest they 
can set up meetings with international organizations to discuss conflict issues. 
In the case of large-scale violence, embassies can facilitate a “‘hotline’ to share 
information at the shortest time possible”.  
In Indonesia, the NL Embassy focal point stationed at the Ministry of 
Public Works “was very helpful and really knows about the difficulties we 
faced on the ground due to emerging conflicts”. In Mali, the NL Embassy 
sometimes participates in the Partners for Resilience Steering Committee, 
including to discuss conflict dynamics.  
NL Embassies can provide crucial information to help reduce conflict 
risk: “In one fact-finding activity, when a conflict was about to brew, the 
Dutch Embassy clarified our role in projects” (Philippines). Embassies can 
discuss the conflict in its contacts with other embassies so they can jointly 
engage in dialogue to influence the government. Embassies can help through 
providing technical and financial support to conflict prevention or risk-
reduction processes, or by providing funding to develop strategies and 
methods for conflict resolution, for studies on root causes of conflict, or to 
support the negotiations among conflicting parties.  
A number of participants suggest the NL Embassy be a “flexible” donor: 
agree a certain level of flexibility in budgets and implementation of the 
programme to enable the partners to better navigate conflict and security 
issues.  
While there is abundant evidence of enabling roles for embassies, and 
suggestions for more support, there is also caution. A PfR partner in 
Guatemala emphasizes that seeking support from the NL Embassy should be 
done with much caution to prevent further escalation of the conflict or 
exposure of the involved CSOs and communities to violent actors.  
 Recommendations for PfR from research participants. 
Research participants from all countries provide a variety of suggestions, with 
the exception of a participant from the Philippines who says nothing is needed 
as the “PfR Landscape Approach provides sufficient guidance for knowing the 
stakeholders, the powers of the actors, issues to be conflict sensitive”.  
One cluster of recommendations focuses on integrating conflict in the 
core of PfR, including: 
• Adjust the programme design so that “PfR has the mandate to work in the 
area of conflict resolution” (Indonesia).  
• The IRM approach should focus more on resource-based conflict and 
expanding livelihood options.  
• A new theory of change and programme strategy should be developed for 
PfR phase 3, integrating conflict dynamics and enabling partners to be 
conflict-sensitive and work on conflict risk reduction. This can be adapted 
for each country.  
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• Making the IRM approach conflict-sensitive requires a good ‘conflict risk 
analysis’. This needs to be done during the proposal development phase 
for PfR 3, suggests a Ugandan participant, “with deeper involvement of 
the country team as compared to development from the global perspective 
only”. Conflict risk assessments need to be integrated in the initial context 
analysis and should include conflict mapping and power dynamics. 
Programme strategy and approaches can be designed based on this 
‘conflict risk analysis’. A participant from Ethiopia feels it important that 
“pre and post analysis of risk is informed by conflict mapping”. 
Other participants suggest increasing programming on conflict 
resolution and peacebuilding within the overall resilience framework of 
IRM: 
• Further analysis is needed on root causes and drivers of conflict and on “how best to 
be ‘conflict-proof’ at various levels” (Uganda). Coupled to this should be 
more attention to conflicts generated by internal mobilization, 
displacement and migration.  
• Reflection on trends of conflicts and how they relate with climate change 
and disasters could help to develop guidelines for integrating conflict 
sensitivity in IRM.  
• Many indicate the need for capacity building and the development of specific tools 
and methods – for example, a capacity-building package on conflict 
management combined with IRM, including case studies on conflict risk 
reduction and resolution. Games and indicators on conflict sensitivity 
linked to IRM should be developed. An Indonesian participant says that 
their ‘do no harm’ policy is a good start but should be extended with a 
‘peacebuilding toolkit’. Cordaid and Caritas seem to have developed such 
toolkits.  
• A training module on conflict risk reduction and peacebuilding could be developed 
as an annex to the existing IRM training manual. Staff should be trained 
on conflict mitigation and peacebuilding. A Ugandan participant suggests 
building the capacity of practitioners who can then build an army of 
facilitators, while an Indonesian participant suggests the “formation of 
local peacebuilders at the community level”. 
• A specific outcome for conflict prevention and management could be added in the new 
PfR PME framework. The framework should enable the monitoring of 
conflict dynamics and the effects of the IRM interventions.  
• Other suggestions refer to the need for flexibility to adapt interventions to 
changing needs on the ground. This includes flexibility in spending the 
PfR budget: the IRM approach should not only focus on policy advocacy 
but also some of the critical basic needs of vulnerable communities.  
Summary 
• In most contexts, partners feel that they can discuss conflict-related issues 
at all levels. This in itself can contribute to the reduction of conflict risk.  
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• Most PfR partners discuss issues of conflict and violence related to the 
programme with their colleagues, the communities involved, CSOs and 
local government.  
• Many partners use the opportunity of half-yearly PME workshops with 
PfR partners to discuss conflict dynamics and issues related with violence. 
In India, for example, conflict around mining operations is repeatedly 
brought up during these workshops.  
• In some cases, such as Guatemala, conflict cannot always be discussed 
openly as this could increase the threat of violence against communities 
and CSOs.  
• In several countries, partners have to be cautious about discussing issues 
with the government: examples are Ethiopia, Guatemala, the Philippines 
and Indonesia. There, partners use neutral language, only talk with trusted 
officials, avoid government communication about this topic altogether, or 
work through the Red Cross. 
• Many but not all partners put conflict-related issues and violence in their 
project reports, which they share with PfR partners and the donor and in 
some countries also with in-country programme stakeholders.  
• Research participants had varying experiences with the NL embassy. In 
some contexts, the embassy proved knowledgeable and helpful to their 
work.  
• Participants provided many suggestions and for the role the NL embassy 
could play in their country or region to support them in conflict situations. 
Some examples are:  
• Lobbying and diplomacy: NL embassies helping PfR through 
‘humanitarian diplomacy’ and other advocacy with government 
officials, in which peacebuilding or the counteracting of 
criminalization of CSOs could be a main focus.  
• Support and resources: especially support in strengthening CSOs’ 
capacity in mediation and conflict resolution. NL embassies can help 
through providing technical and financial support to conflict 
prevention or risk reduction processes; funding to develop strategies 
and methods for conflict resolution; funding for studies on root 
causes of conflict; or financial support for negotiations among 
conflicting parties. A number of participants suggest the NL embassy 
should be a ‘flexible donor’, agreeing a certain level of flexibility in 
budgets and implementation of the programme to enable the partners 
to better navigate conflict and security issues. 
• Mediation and prevention: NL embassies can help through providing 
technical and financial support to conflict prevention or risk-
reduction processes. In some cases, embassies have established 
platforms for dialogue at national level and facilitate “safe spaces 
where different actors can talk to each other without fear of 
harassment” (Ethiopia). They can set up meetings with international 
organizations to discuss conflict issues.  
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• Aid and communication: in the case of large-scale violence, the 
embassy can facilitate a ‘hotline’ to share information quickly or 
provide crucial information to the population.  
• Research participants made recommendations around integrating conflict 
in the core of PfR and on increasing programming on conflict resolution 
and peacebuilding within the overall resilience framework of IRM.  
Let us conclude this chapter with some final remarks provided by 
participants 
Conflict is ever-present in many forms. Within communities, among social 
classes, between communities and powerful economic interest, between 
communities and government, and so on. In the end, all these can be traced back 
to the question of who holds political and economic power, and who doesn’t. 
Where conflict is intense, the elements of control over natural resources are 
present. Moreover, the vulnerabilities resulting from long-standing and 
unresolved conflicts are being exacerbated by natural hazard events and climate 
change. Conflict-affected IDPs in Mindanao for example had to contend with 
drought during the first quarter of the year and floods during the third quarter. 
The situation calls for more focused attention on IRM work in conflict settings, 
made more complex by the interaction with natural hazard events and climate 
change. (Philippines) 
Personally, I believe that to adapt the IRM approach in communities, it is 
through learning by doing. People are thirsty, hungry, they are migrants, women 
or vulnerable young people ... they need to learn and do something that helps 
them understand what they are doing. important of the integral approach in the 
search for their resilience and to have their livelihoods guaranteed. (Guatemala) 
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6 Conclusions  
Before reaching some general conclusions, we present conclusions with regard 
to the different research questions. 
1. In what ways does PfR encounter conflicts and social tensions in its 
activities, both in the communities of intervention as well as in the 
IRM dialogues with government authorities and private companies at 
local, national and regional levels? 
PfR experiences conflict in many forms and at all levels: between 
stakeholders in the PfR focus regions, in other areas, or generalized across the 
country. In particular in Mali, Guatemala and some parts of the Philippines, 
there is widespread, large-scale, structural violence, leading to overall insecurity which 
hampers the entire environment of PfR. But in many other settings we found 
examples of violent incidents, threats of violence, structural or cultural 
violence. 
All PfR alliance partners and CSO partners encounter resource-based 
conflicts and social tension in programme activities: within and between 
communities (for example, those with differentiated status or entitlement), 
between different resource user groups, or between communities and the 
government or private companies.  
The vast majority of these conflicts are resource-based and relate to 
access, availability and usage of natural resources such as land, water or forest 
resources. Such conflicts are embedded in all aspects of IRM. These conflicts 
become sharper when they happen between different ethnic or identity groups. 
Lack of government regulation or lack of enforcement of existing legislation 
can deepen conflicts over resources between communities. Other factors that 
tend to increase conflict are related to gender and marginality. 
In many conflicts, governments tend to favour the interests of private 
companies over those of communities. In some cases, the government itself is 
engaged in commercial resource exploitation. Weak governments often lack 
institutions that can resolve such conflicts. Where governments have policies 
for resource management, this can work for or against communities. There is 
often a lack of accountability from government towards local communities, 
which is particularly significant when the local government is a partner in PfR. 
This means that problems may be addressed and resolved within the network 
but can also lead to complications and dilemmas over how to address the 
issues.  
Conclusion: All PfR organizations and their CSO partners 
experience social tension and conflicts with regard to different interests 
in many forms and at all levels, between and among stakeholders in the 
PfR focus regions, other areas or generalized across in the country. The 
vast majority of the conflicts encountered by PfR are resource-based. In 
these cases, governments tend to favour the interests of private 
companies over the interests of the community. 
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2. What are the effects of these conflicts and social tensions on our IRM 
approach? 
The work of PfR and the IRM approach are affected by different forms of 
violence, both generalized and local. Some areas are difficult to access, leading 
to monitoring challenges. Beneficiaries and CSO partners are targeted and 
violated, and in some areas the programme has had to be been downscaled or 
halted. 
Threats of violence hamper the effectiveness of PfR, causing it to act with 
caution and avoid risks in addressing resource management, in particular the 
access to resources of marginal groups who suffer from structural and cultural 
violence. Threats to programme and staff are not uncommon but they are not 
always reported as PfR does not want to expose their CSO partners to further 
risks where reports may subsequently be read by government actors.  
Structural violence similarly stands in the way of IRM effectiveness. This is 
an issue in all PfR countries: laws and policies pertaining to control of 
resources and other economic matters can sustain patterns of marginalization 
and vulnerability. Structural violence against women is found in all countries: 
women are excluded from economic opportunities as they lack access to 
productive resources like land. There are also many instances of cultural 
violence affecting PfR work, including discrimination against indigenous 
peoples in Guatemala, the caste system in India, and tribal communities in the 
Philippines. These issues skew dialogue, impede fair resource management and 
lead to conflict. Natural resource issues often intertwine with structural and 
cultural violence related to inequalities and identity politics. 
Civil society, core to the IRM approach, often finds itself in the heart of 
conflict. In some countries, the government criminalizes CSOs and advocacy 
groups and brands them as anti-government. As a result, some CSOs are 
threatened and intimidated, including by military and militarized groups. 
Almost 25% of PfR partners experience these ‘negative pressures’ from 
government institutions and officials and in some cases from private 
companies. This has serious consequences for programme implementation: in 
some cases, the government is preventing CSOs from working on ‘sensitive’ 
issues related to resource management.  
Conclusion: A core tenet of PfR – strengthening civil society for 
IRM – brings about conflict and social tension. Natural resources are 
often a major cause of contention and the role of civil society is often 
contested. PfR often finds itself in a difficult position where it has to 
balance avoid further conflict against finding the space to address the 
root causes of unfair and unsustainable resource management.  
 
3. Does PfR’s IRM approach exacerbate conflict dynamics? 
Links between conflict and resource allocation issues such as land-use 
planning make PfR by definition a party in possible conflicts. PfR partners are 
generally well aware of the fact that their IRM programme touches on 
resource-based conflicts and they put great effort into navigating this reality to 
avoid exacerbating conflict dynamics.  
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Many partners monitor evolving conflicts and assess the effects of their 
interventions on the conflict dynamics. They adapt programmes to changing 
realities on the ground using their theory of change.  
Conflicts can occur within and between communities concerning their 
selection and participation in the programme: who will benefit and how will 
these benefits be distributed? PfR partners employ participatory consultations 
with communities, which can lead to agreement on public and shared benefits. 
PfR partners indicate that engagement in IRM dialogues can sometimes be 
a risky business and the more large-scale and complex conflicts become – and 
the more interwoven with inequalities and identity politics – the more difficult 
it is to oversee the impacts of programme interventions.  
Conclusion: We have found no indication that the IRM approach of 
PfR exacerbates conflict. PfR appears to be largely successful in 
addressing the risk of doing so, for example through community 
dialogues and a patient approach based on building broad acceptance of 
PfR. 
 
4. How are these effects differentiated for men and women, other 
genders, people of different castes, ethnicities, livelihoods, etc?  
Among the surveys, there was a broad understanding that women are 
affected by structural and cultural violence, and there were some examples of 
community-level conflicts that directly related to gender. There were also very 
many examples of how community-level conflicts are related to inequalities 
and identity politics. 
On the questions on how PfR deals with women and marginalized groups, 
it was striking that all research participants provided evidence on how they 
address gender inequalities in their programmes. There appears a PfR-wide and 
deeply felt awareness that it is important to include women and make sure they 
have a voice in IRM. However, the attention to gender is not explicitly geared 
to conflict. 
By comparison, there was less attention in the responses to this question 
to how PfR addresses conflict and forms of violence against other 
marginalized groups, for example ethnic minorities or lower castes, and in 
particular those groups that are disadvantaged in their access to resources.  
A number of responses conveyed how the inclusive IRM approach of 
PfR, favouring a strategy of dialogue rather than confrontation, may lead to 
situations where partners refrain from explicitly addressing underlying conflicts 
and the ways these affect marginalized groups.  
It also became clear that, even in programmes where specific attention was 
focused on the inclusion of women, these approaches may have unintended 
effects. For example, men sometimes felt left out, or women ended up bearing 
the double burden for participating in ‘women’s’ programmes at the same time 
as being responsible for household chores.  
Conclusion: The PfR programme has a strong and positive attention 
to issues of gender, although some problems are encountered where this 
has some negative side-effects. The attention for addressing conflict and 
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forms of violence against other marginalized groups is less systematic 
and can be complicated in striking a balance between avoiding conflict 
and addressing injustice. 
 
5. What have been strategies of PfR to deal with conflict, and with what 
results? 
Addressing conflict is integral to the IRM approach of PfR. We 
distinguish three major aspects – monitoring conflict; addressing conflict in 
programme implementation; and conflict resolution – but in PfR work they are 
often intertwined. 
In all three aspects, PfR partners and engaged CSOs rely on dialogue and 
participation. Most have a “do no harm” approach, preferring a ‘non-
confrontational’ approach and to facilitate stakeholder dialogues to deal with 
conflicting interests between different users of natural resources. Research 
participants say this gives the best results as it increases understanding between 
parties and can build bridges between communities and government and other 
stakeholders. 
The trade-off of this non-confrontational approach is that it may 
complicate addressing root causes and explicitly advocating the interests of 
marginalized groups. PfR and CSO staff seem to be well aware of this inherent 
dilemma and portray their work as a balancing act. Certain pieces of 
information do not surface during formal multi-stakeholder meetings. This, as 
some research participants clarified, can be dealt with by complementing the 
meetings with informal interaction. Furthermore, as staff members usually 
come from the areas where PfR works, they can provide a lot of background 
knowledge. 
PfR further draws on many different participatory tools. These include 
interest mapping, power analysis, survey and assessment tools, context analysis 
and conflict risk assessments. Many of these tools have been provided by the 
Dutch partners, but there is no shared set of tools at the level of PfR. Similarly, 
many research participants work for an organization that has a do-no-harm 
policy that has been introduced by the Dutch partner, in particular Cordaid, 
CARE and the Red Cross. The conflict-related tools are separately introduced 
from the IRM tools, even though some participants observed that the IRM 
tools can be made useful for conflict-related analysis. Some participants 
mention that having tools available does not mean that they are being used in 
practice. While there is a lot of knowledge and practice of conflict monitoring, 
conflict sensitivity and conflict resolution, it stems mainly from ‘learning by 
doing’ and many participants expressed a need for further capacity building, 
theoretical frameworks and guidelines.  
In sum, there are many concrete examples of how PfR was able to defuse 
an evolving conflict or resolve a conflict. The examples were mainly geared to 
community-level and resource-based conflicts based on small-scale diplomacy 
with authorities to protect the interests of marginalized or oppressed groups. 
Large-scale, escalated and structural conflicts are often beyond the scope of 
influence of PfR.  
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Conclusion: Conflict sensitivity is widely adopted in PfR, but without a 
standardized in approach. There are many examples where PfR is successful in 
mitigating or solving local-level conflicts over resource use. Large-scale, 
escalated and structural conflicts are beyond the scope of influence of PfR.  
 
Our final conclusion concerns the question what opportunities there are 
for better integrating a conflict-sensitive approach and/or conflict risk 
reduction approach in IRM.  
Conflicts and violence form part of the realities that PfR seeks to change 
through IRM. This means that conflict monitoring, conflict sensitivity and in 
many cases conflict resolution are part of the everyday practice of the PfR 
programme. 
In the first two phases of the PfR programme, there has been no explicit 
attention to conflict, and as a result conflict-related activity has mainly been 
developed through ‘learning by doing’ and sensitive deployment of the IRM 
approach and tools.  
A special challenge for PfR is that local-level resource-based conflicts and 
forms of structural violence occur between actors that are all included in the 
IRM approach of PfR, which is rooted in acceptance, dialogue and 
participatory multi-stakeholder activities. Whereas this inclusiveness is 
considered to be effective for PfR, it makes it challenging to directly confront 
the root causes of conflict. This creates operational dilemmas, and there is 
currently no space in PfR to report on dealing with conflicting interests within 
the programme, and hence there is no space for jointly discussing and learning 
from these dilemmas. 
Because PfR doesn’t want to do harm, and is based on a multi-stakeholder 
approach, it usually takes a non-confrontational approach towards injustices 
done to marginalized groups. Whereas this may often be the best choice, it is 
not the subject of policy discussion or reflection, and the question of how this 
affects the space to address the root causes of disaster risk remains largely 
unaddressed.  
PfR partners already have ample experience in elements of conflict-
sensitive programming, such as conflict risk analysis and assessments, inclusive 
planning and engagement in multi-stakeholder dialogues.  The development of 
a new PfR programme provides a good opportunity to integrate conflict 
dynamics in the overall resilience framework of PfR and to support partners 
and CSOs to advance their conflict-sensitive work and conflict risk reduction.  
Conclusion: PfR is very practised in conflict sensitivity and its 
methods are largely in line with a conflict-sensitive approach. However, 
conflict sensitivity is not systematically applied nor incorporated in the 
programme objectives, guidelines or toolboxes. 
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7 Recommendations 
Overall recommendation: 
For PfR to become more conflict-sensitive, it is recommended that the alliance 
acknowledges conflict more explicitly in analysis and approach and ensures 
conflict-sensitivity in the design and programming of its future activities.  
 
Specific recommendations: 
1 Adopt a ‘do no harm’ approach   
• Focus on doing no harm (avoiding negative impacts) by working in an 
inclusive manner and maximizing positive effects of the programme 
on stability. In order to do this properly: 
o All PfR organizations and their country offices should have a ‘do 
no harm’ policy 
o The do-no-harm policies of the individual PfR organizations 
should be reviewed to develop a generic PfR do-no-harm policy 
and guidelines. All PfR partners should be trained to apply these. 
o Do-no-harm policies should take into account the position of 
marginalized groups to ensure that PfR does not lead to further 
marginalization.  
2 Ensure conflict sensitivity in analysis, approach and interventions of 
PfR 
• Acknowledge that conflict is common and widespread in the PfR 
countries and among its stakeholders and that this affects the IRM 
approach and results of interventions – and vice versa.  
• Ensure conflict dynamics are integrated as a cross-cutting issue 
into the overall context and stakeholder analysis of the new 
Theory of Change and in the programmatic approach.  
• Explicitly address conflict sensitivity in the objectives, guidelines 
and toolboxes of PfR. 
• Conflict sensitivity is highly context-dependent and hence the 
country-level ToRs and decision-making should be in the lead as 
to how conflict sensitivity is adhered to in practice, taking into 
account the balance between conflict sensitivity and the objective 
of addressing the root causes of disaster risks. 
• As part of conflict sensitivity, countries need to review their 
strategic choices with regard to non-confrontational or more 
confrontational approaches and monitor the impact of these 
choices on the balance between the objectives of conflict 
sensitivity and addressing root causes of disaster risks. 
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• The PME framework needs to include monitoring of conflict 
dynamics and their impact on IRM, and vice versa – IRM’s impact 
on conflict dynamics.  
3 Report explicitly on conflicts and violence 
• Incorporate conflict sensitivity in the reporting format of PfR. 
• Provide a ‘safe reporting channel’ and space to reflect on conflict-
related issues. 
4 Strengthen capacities of PfR partners on conflict sensitivity  
• Increase organizational knowledge and understanding: make sure 
PfR partners’ staff (in the Hague, in the countries, regions) have 
adequate theoretical knowledge and understanding on conflict 
dynamics in the context in which they operate (particularly with 
respect to inter-group relations), how this interacts with IRM 
programme, what conflict-sensitive programming entails and the 
different concepts used: conflict risk reduction, conflict sensitivity, 
conflict resolution and peacebuilding.  
• Adopt guidelines for conflict-sensitive programming and where 
possible integrate these in existing PfR guidelines, principles and 
criteria. Guidelines can be adjusted in-country to adapt to the 
specific context. 
• Adopt a conflict-sensitive toolbox and where possible integrate the 
tools into existing IRM tools that are used in PfR, for example the 
Conflict Risk Analysis tool developed by Cordaid. A conflict risk 
analysis is a first key step to be taken for conflict sensitive 
programming. 
• Strengthen accountability to communities in PfR programmes 
through strengthening complaint procedures and other means.  
• Strengthen staff capacities and skills:  
o Train relevant staff in the use and implementation of conflict 
risk assessment tools, such as community risk assessments, 
power analysis, and stakeholder analysis.  
o Train relevant staff in skills needed to implement do-no-harm 
policies and a conflict-sensitivity toolbox as mentioned above.  
o Integrate conflict sensitivity into IRM training manuals and 
other training materials. 
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Appendix 2: Terms of  Reference research IRM & Conflict 
Stakeholders and lines of communication  
The assignment is commissioned by CARE Nederland, on behalf of the PfR Programme 
Working Group. The primary contact person for the researchers is Bart Weijs (PfR 
Programme Manager at CARE). The PfR Programme Working Group has jointly agreed on 
the ToR and will be responsible for decisions about the direction of research and feedback to 
the draft report.  
During the research period, the researchers will be in regular contact with the PfR alliance 
members Netherlands Red Cross, CARE Nederland, Cordaid, Red Cross Red Crescent 
Climate Centre and Wetlands Internationals to collect input and discuss proposals and 
progress. 
 
On PfR and IRM 
The Partners for Resilience alliance consists of Cordaid, CARE Nederland, Wetlands 
International, The Red Cross Red Crescent Climate Centre and the Netherlands Red Cross, 
and about 50 partner civil society organizations (CSOs) worldwide. PfR contributes to the 
resilience of communities by integrating climate change adaptation and ecosystem management 
and restoration into Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR). With this Integrated Risk Management 
(IRM) approach, communities strengthen their capacities to reduce the impact of disasters. 
More information can be found on our website: www.partnersforresilience.nl. 
 
Purpose of this study 
The study will investigate how IRM programming is affected by and can deal with conflict, 
leading to identification of lessons learnt/best practice and a set of recommendations, by 
analysing the experience in the current PfR programme. 
Though PfR works in conflict-affected countries and contexts, we focus on Integrated Risk 
Management and do not address conflict explicitly (e.g. in our baseline context and power 
analysis, or in our Theories of Change). We do take it up in some of our work, but we don’t 
report on it because it isn’t part of our ToC, and we may miss opportunities for addressing 
conflict and instability. Our work is affected and even constrained by conflict in some 
contexts, and we might be able to do something about this is if we would address conflict 
more explicitly.  
 
Scope 
The study will consider different types and levels of conflict, to develop a nuanced 
understanding of what this means for IRM. We are encountering different types of conflict in 
different countries, both in terms of the source (e.g. gang wars or social tensions related to 
decreasing access to natural resources / livelihood options) and the level, from micro-level 
conflict at community level, to higher-level conflict like the conflict in Mali or Ethiopia. 
The study will target all PfR countries: Guatemala, Haiti, Mali, Ethiopia, Uganda, South Sudan, 
Kenya, India, Indonesia and Philippines. 
Research questions 
7. In what ways does PfR encounter conflicts and social tensions in its activities, both in 
the communities of intervention as well as in the IRM dialogues at local, national and 
regional levels? 
8. What are the effects of these conflicts and social tensions on our IRM approach? 
9. How does an IRM approach affect conflict dynamics in intended and unintended 
ways? 
10. How are these effects differentiated for men and women, other genders, people of 
different castes, ethnicities, livelihoods etc? 
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11. What have been strategies of PfR to deal with conflict, and with what results? 
12. What opportunities are there for better integrating a conflict-sensitive approach 
and/or a/peace-building (conflict risk reduction) approach in IRM? 
13. What can PfR learn from other good research /reports/best practices on using an 
integrated IRM-like approach to strengthening resilience in conflict-affected settings? 
 
Approach 
The study will primarily be conducted through desk research, a survey, skype interviews, and a 
validation workshop. Reports are available for the previous years of PfR, and PfR partners are 
used to comfortably talk through Skype. Where relevant, local researchers can be engaged to 
conduct additional research and interviews. 
This leads to the following sequence of steps: 
1. Reading of relevant reports from PfR. 
2. Developing a comprehensive, theory-informed and educational survey. 
Because questions will be introduced by small essays (of one paragraph) on the 
importance of the question, the researchers will add depth to the answers and as 
well provide some food for thought for PfR staff on how they can deal with the 
nexus between conflict and disaster in their immediate work. 
3. Make the survey into an E-based instrument, and personally invite a large 
number of PfR partners to fill in the survey. This can be done throughout all 
the countries. 
4. The response to the survey can be analysed, in conjunction with the findings 
from step one. 
Based on this, the researchers can select several participants to interview in-
depth over Skype 
5. As part of the interviews, the researchers will ask who among the participants 
likes to be involved in reading the report and recommendations. 
6. Analysis and draft report 
7. Soliciting feedback and recommendations, through a workshop / webinar 
8. Produce a final report. 
 
Deliverables 
1. Refined ToR/research questions 
2. Survey 
3. Analysis and lessons learnt/best practice/recommendations 
 
Budget 
Up to 25,000 euros (see elaborate budget attached) 
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Appendix 3: Survey 
The PfR Programme Working Group has assigned a research on how PfR has 
encountered and dealt with conflict in its Integrated Risk Management 
programme. 
Though PfR works in conflict-affected countries and contexts, it focuses on 
Integrated Risk Management and does not address conflict or insecurity 
explicitly. Even where PfR addresses conflict, it is rarely reported on. 
However, PfR work may be affected and even constrained by conflict, and the 
question is if PfR should and could address conflict more explicitly? 
The assignment is commissioned to a team of the ISS of Erasmus University, 
led by professor Thea Hilhorst. Marie-José Vervest long-familiar with PfR and 
now an independent consultant, is part of the team, together with PhD 
candidates from ISS.  
This survey aims to collect your experiences with conflict, insecurity or social 
tension and your views on how PfR should deal with this. The report that the 
survey feeds into, will be used for the new PfR proposal. The survey follows 
on from a literature review and findings will be complemented with a limited 
number of follow-up interviews. A draft report will be produced in December 
2019. The research participants and the PfR Programme Working Group will 
be asked to provide feedback. 
The questions of the survey are introduced by explanatory text-boxes. Reading 
these boxes, thinking about your current practice and experiences and 
answering the questions will take you approximately between 60 – 90 minutes.  
The survey is designed for individual responses, but you are more than 
welcome to consult and discuss with your PfR team or other colleagues the 
survey topics and questions.  
You can interrupt filling in the survey at any moment and continue completion 
in a later stage.  
The questions in the survey may touch on sensitive issues. Please feel free to 
skip a question in case you are uncomfortable with it.  
We will treat your responses confidentially and with utmost care. Your answers 
will only be used for the purpose of this study, will only be read by the 
researchers and will not be shared with PfR organizations. The research team 
may use general insights from the study in its academic publications, but this 
does not comprise the citation of specific answers unless you consent 
otherwise.   
If you have questions or complaints regarding this survey, you can contact the 
project leader at hilhorst@iss.nl, or the contact person of PfR for this research: 
Bart Weijs, from CARE Netherlands at weijs@carenederland.org 
By flipping to the next page and start to respond to questions, you 
acknowledge that you have read the above and that you are participating in the 
survey on a voluntary basis. You consent to have the data collected during the 
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study, i.e. your views regarding conflict in IRM and the implementation of PfR, 
processed for the report.  
As we fully respect your decision about the anonymity of your replies, at the 
end of the survey you can fill in more options regarding confidentiality.  
For the purpose of the research, we ask you to state your name, country and 
organization. 
Name: 
Country: 
Organization:   
 
Cluster 1: Conflict 
This survey is about how PfR deals with conflict, but what do we mean when 
we talk about conflict?  
Conflict occurs when two or more parties find their interests incompatible, 
express hostile attitudes or take actions that damage the other party’s ability to 
pursue their interests84. 
Conflict is quite common in society, and not necessarily bad. There are always 
goal incompatibilities and competing interests, certainly in development 
endeavours and (natural) resource management. Whenever people seek social 
change, there is bound to be some kind of opposition that needs to be 
resolved. The question is if these can be addressed constructively or if this will 
lead to conflict.  
Different types of conflicts co-exist, each with their dynamics, and many will 
influence one another. Conflict dynamics at the regional, national or district 
level can affect local communities. Within communities other types of conflict 
may also occur that may or may not be connected to conflict at other levels of 
society.  
 
Question 1.  
Can you give concrete examples of how you encounter ‘interest-based conflicts’ between 
different groups or stakeholders in your PfR program? (please give at least 1 example each) 
- Within communities 
- Between different communities 
- Between different resource user groups in the landscape (for example, 
agro-business, (local) government, farmers, pastoralists) 
- Between communities and (local, district, national) government author-
ities 
- Other? 
 
 
84https://www.christianaid.org.uk/sites/default/files/2018-06/Conflict-Prevention-
Field-Guide-June-2018.pdf 
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Conflict may or may not be accompanied by physical violence, and whether or 
not something is considered a conflict partly depends on interpretation of the 
people involved. There are different types of conflict, depending on the level 
and type of violence. In reality, we see that many conflicts have multiple types 
of violence:  
1. Large-scale violence that leads to overall insecurity and hampers eve-
rything 
2. Incidents of physical violence, such as assault, killing, kidnapping, or 
forced displacement.  
3. Threat of violence and associated uncertainty. 
4. Structural violence, concerning processes by which a group oppresses 
another through structural means, such as exclusion from educational or 
economic opportunities or restrictions of freedom of assembly and speech. 
5. Cultural violence. This is a semi-permanent state through which some 
forms of physical violence and structural violence are considered as legiti-
mate, especially by the majority; for example, through ideology, religion or 
social stratification. Minority violence to counter these structural problems 
will often be considered illegitimate. 
 
Question 2 
Which of these types of conflict with violence do you encounter in your daily PfR work? Can 
you please give 1 concrete example per type if applicable? 
• Large-scale violence at national level or in parts of the country 
• Incidents of violence in PfR focus area  
• Threats of violence and associated uncertainty by known or unknown 
groups 
• Structural violence (e.g. embedded in policies and legislation) 
• Cultural violence (e.g. embedded in religion, ideology, language) 
 
Cluster 2: Conflict & Integrated Resource Management 
(IRM) 
Conflicting interests are part of IRM and any work on Disaster Risk 
Reduction, Climate Change Adaptation and Environmental Management and 
Restoration. Climate change can lead to resource competition and migration 
and therefore has the potential to increase conflict. The relationship between 
climate change and conflict is highly influenced by other factors and socio-
political variables, such as economic and political instability.  
Climate change affects regions differently, precisely due to these socio-political 
factors. If a country is more politically stable, the more likely it is to peacefully 
resolve resource shortage and competition. Environmental degradation due to 
over-exploitation of land and water resources or harmful practices such as 
water pollution can also lead to more pressure on resources and can force 
people to migrate as a coping mechanism. This could lead to more conflict in 
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the receiving areas due to resource scarcity, ethnic tensions and increased 
marginalization.  
Scarcity of natural resources and competition can increase the likelihood of 
conflict, but not always; societies that are able to adapt can find different 
modes of livelihoods. Therefore, contextual socio-political and economic 
factors are important to understand the relationship between resources and 
conflict. In a socio-political context with high inequalities, ‘resource capture’ 
can allow elites to control resources at the cost of others. The co-management 
of resources can provide opportunities for dealing with resource conflicts, but 
can also create new conflicts, exacerbate old ones, or result in strengthening 
control instead of sharing power. 
There are also links between disaster and conflict. Natural hazards only turn 
into a disaster when people are vulnerable and unprepared. When working to 
increase disaster resilience, it is crucial to understand the socio-political and 
economic factors that put people at risk. The vulnerability to disasters is 
increased by conflict as it erodes response capacity over time; different conflict 
contexts will affect DRR and disaster response in different ways. Disasters can 
also aggravate conflict. Whether a disaster negatively impacts conflict depends 
on a variety of factors; for example, low DRR investments or a weak 
government response. These factors in turn increase the likelihood of disasters, 
as weak DRR, government capacity and political instability increase 
vulnerability and compromise disaster preparedness.  
 
Question 3 
In question 1, you gave examples of how you encounter ‘interest-based 
conflicts’ between different stakeholders in your PfR programme.  
Here we like to know HOW you monitor and/or address evolving conflicts (of 
interest) of communities with other stakeholders?  
3.1 Can you give an example using (one of) the following methods? Only give an example for 
methods you have actually used in practice. We like to know your experiences: did you have 
results? did you experience challenges? 
• Discussion-based methods with PfR partners, CSOs, communities 
(formal or informal) 
• Consultation with stakeholders at different level 
• Interest mapping, power analysis and other participatory knowledge 
building tools 
• Complaint procedures 
• Other 
• No methods at all, there are constraints which prevent us from moni-
toring (evolving) interest-based conflicts 
PfR strengthens capacities of civil society actors to lobby and advocate for 
Integrated Risk Management including a fair allocation of (natural) resources to 
different user groups. Where conflict is already present or conflicting interests 
play out strongly, this can lead to situations where CSOs become targets of 
negative pressure, in some cases violence, from other actors in society.  
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Question 4 
Have you or your partners/local CSOs faced increased negative pressure from specific actors 
(government, private sector, or other actors) as a result of strengthened capacities and improved 
knowledge?  
No 
Yes 
If ‘yes’ can you please elaborate or give an example? How do you deal with it? 
Do you have any further suggestions how to mitigate these negative pressures?  
 
Cluster 3: Gender and Marginalized Groups 
The vulnerability for disasters and climate change are different for men and 
women, as well as for different social groups. Different groups also have 
different access to land, water and other resources that are vital to integrated 
risk management. In most societies, women are subordinated to men and 
hence have more vulnerabilities and less access to resources. Similarly, 
marginalized groups such as landless people, single parents, or discriminated 
minorities, have more vulnerabilities and less access to resources. As a result, 
there may be interest-based conflicts, where women and marginalized groups 
may be less capable to assert their interests. 
Integrated risk management programmes can have different impacts on 
resource-based conflicts and power relations that relate to gender and social 
groups: 
a. Programmes can ignore gender and social relations, and thereby 
unwittingly reproduce and strengthen existing conflicts and power relations. 
b. Programmes can address gender and social relations, and result in more 
inclusive risk management and more empowerment of women and 
marginalized groups. 
c. Programmes can have unintended side-effects when they stir up social 
tensions and evoke negative responses, backlashes or even violence. For 
example, economic empowerment of women sometimes goes hand in hand 
with an increase in domestic violence. Or, special attention to minority ethnic 
groups may provoke violence from majority groups. 
 
Question 5 
What are your methods to ensure inclusion of women and marginalized groups in your 
program?  
Have you experienced negative unintended side-effects when involving women and 
marginalized groups, including indigenous groups, youth or casts  
• If yes: what happened and how did you deal with it? 
• If not: did you prevent it in a specific way? 
 
Cluster 4: How can we make PfR more conflict-sensitive?  
The implementation of projects always has an impact on the communities. 
They can bring benefits, but also produce, exacerbate, or create the condition 
for social conflict. Multiple examples, including from PfR, show that this is 
common. Sometimes conflict relates with disputes over the benefits of the 
projects, the social history and dynamics of the places where they intervene, or  
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perceived biases for or against certain parts of the community. The 
implementation of the project in one community can be a problem to another 
group. Conflicts related to the project, or the places where they are 
implemented, can result in delays, extra costs, or even the cancellation of the 
programmes. 
Beyond the development of participatory mechanism during the planning 
and implementation of the projects, projects can be active in assessing and 
reducing the risk of conflict. Multiple tools and strategies exist for this, most of 
them aiming to understand the general context and history where projects are 
implemented, the diversity of stakeholders involved, and the impacts that the 
project can have. Having a conflict-sensitive approach aligns with the ‘do no 
harm’ strategies that most aid and development organizations adhere to. It also 
links up to peace building processes, although building peace is not the same as 
conflict sensitivity or conflict risk reduction. 
 
 
Conflict sensitive approach vs Conflict risk reduction (based on USAID definitions) 
Conflict sensitivity refers to the ability of an organization to:  
1. Understand the conflict dynamics in the context in which they operate, particularly 
with respect to intergroup relations;  
2. Understand the interaction between the (Resilience) intervention and the conflict 
dynamics in the specific context;  
3. Act upon this understanding in order to avoid negative impacts 
and maximize positive impacts of the (Resilience) intervention (on the conflict 
dynamics).  
To work on Conflict Risk Reduction, it is needed to add a 4th ability: 
4. Make deliberate efforts to address drivers of conflict and to contribute to stability / 
conflict risk reduction.  
  
This can be translated into 2 different programming strategies:  
a) a focus on doing-no-harm (avoid negative impacts), e.g. by working in an inclusive 
manner; or a focus on maximizing positive effects on stability without changing the 
primary objectives of the Resilience project / program;  
b) deliberately designing objectives of the Resilience project/programmeto have an 
impact on improving stability (i.e. work on conflict risk reduction, peace dialogue) 
 
Question 6 
Does your organization have a do no harm policy? 
Yes 
No 
What methods do you use to be conflict-sensitive?  
What are constraints you face in employing conflict-sensitive methods?  
 
Question 7:  
Does the way you implement Integrated Risk Management in your programmeaffect conflict 
dynamics in intended and unintended ways?  
Can you give some examples?  
Some PfR partners actively work on conflict resolution in their PfR programme. Can you give 
some examples?  
What challenges you encounter when working on conflict resolution?  
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Question 8: 
Some conflict contexts might be too sensitive or maybe too threatening for 
local communities or civil society organizations to address. In other cases, 
CSOs might feel they cannot address conflict because of insufficient backing-
up from higher levels. Some organizations may lack the mandate to address 
evolving conflicts between parties.  
What are the challenges for you to address or integrate conflict (sensitiveness) in your IRM 
approach? 
 
Cluster 5: Discussing and reporting 
Conflict and violence cannot be talked about openly in every context, 
sometimes including with colleagues and donors. This makes a difference for 
possibilities to address conflict and seek help.  
 
Question 9: 
Do you discuss conflict-related issues with the following actors: CSOs, PfR colleagues, 
government officials, Communities, Donors (e.g. in your reports), other. If not, why not? 
 
Question 10: 
In what way can higher level actors (e.g. embassy, Dutch PfR partners) support you when you 
encounter conflict? 
 
Last but not least 
 
Question 11: 
Which concrete suggestions do you have to adapt the IRM approach to make it more conflict-
sensitive? 
 
Question 12 
Do you have any other remarks or issues that have not been addressed in previous questions? 
 
Question 13 
The research team may need to do some additional interviews on Skype to 
deepen the insights from the survey. 
Would you be available to share more of your experience during a follow-up individual skype 
interview? 
If yes, pls give your skype name:  
Now that you know the questions we have asked, we would like to ask you 
now to specify what you like to consent to: 
I hereby consent to having my answers quoted in research publications without 
mentioning my name. YES/NO 
I hereby consent to having my actual name stated with the quotes referred to 
above. YES/NO 
I hereby consent to having my research data stored and used for future 
publications of the research team of ISS/EUR YES/NO  
  
Thank you very much!    
